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I. INTRODUCTION
"Subrogation in letters of credit." The words strike fear in the
hearts of some letter-of-credit aficionados. "If [the rules governing
letters of credit] are subordinated to more pliable precepts appro-
priate to equitable resolution of disputes, the very existence of the
letter of credit as a useful business device can be destroyed as
surely as a wisteria vine can strangle an oak."'
For others, the phrase is a welcome acknowledgment that certain
principles of equity often applied in, but not limited to, the surety-
ship or guaranty context are equally applicable in the letter-of-
credit context. With two parallel drafting processes underway, one
in the guaranty or suretyship area with the promulgation by the
American Law Institute of a Restatement (Third) of Suretyship,
and the other in the letter-of-credit area with a revision of Article
5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, some resolution of the extent
of the overlap between the two fields may be forthcoming.
1. Henry Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARZ. L. REV. 239, 239
(1982). Another colorful passage continues the attack on equitable doctrines, asserting that
"the hosts of Conscience, like roaches, are a hardy breed. If, as Conscience, they are not
received in the courts, they seek with increasing success to return as Law." Id. at 247. Al-
though the bulk of Mr. Harfield's comments deal with the inapplicability of equitable con-
cepts to determinations of compliance with the terms of the letter of credit or to assign-
ments of the whole benefit of credits, his words ring in the ears of those who similarly
oppose application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation.
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The present drafting of a Restatement of Suretyship is an ambi-
tious effort to distill various types of devices (guaranties, assump-
tions of debt, performance bonds, payment bonds, and fidelity
bonds) to their essence and to articulate basic commonly shared
principles.2 In many respects, the effort is like that undertaken by
the drafters of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, who en-
deavored to rationalize the principles applicable to the various
types of security devices previously subject to divergent and often
conflicting statutory treatment.' Given such an ambitious effort, it
is not surprising that debate surrounds decisions to include certain
types of transactions 4 and exclude others. One arguable type of
surety relationship presently excluded from the scope of the Re-
statement,5 which this Article will examine at length, is the rela-
tionship arising from establishment of a letter of credit.'
This exclusion reflects the implicit decision that many, if not all,
of the rules governing guaranties and other suretyship devices are
inappropriate in the letter-of-credit context. Such a decision is un-
doubtedly correct with respect to some of the suretyship rules,
such as those relating to the secondary obligor's payment obliga-
tion and the availability of what are known as suretyship defenses.
Yet with respect to devices which it does cover, the Restatement of
Suretyship acknowledges that not all the rules are applicable to
every transaction.7 The possibility that devices could be made sub-
ject to some but not all of the suretyship rules raises the question
2. At this time, the two current drafts of the Restatement are the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF SURETYSHIP (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992) (covering §§ 1-20) and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF SURETYSHIP (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993) (covering §§ 18-45). Only §§ 1-17 of Tentative
Draft No. 1 were approved by the ALI in May 1992. Id. at xv.
3. For the classic and most comprehensive treatment of these pre-Code security devices
and the eventual drafting of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, see GRANT GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
4. The area of fidelity bonds is such an example. The sections of the Restatement cover-
ing fidelity bonds have not yet been promulgated. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 1 cmt. o (Tent. Draft No. 1).
5. Id. § 3(2).
6. Initially, one might opine on the distinction between a letter of credit and a nonletter
of credit, whether labeled a guaranty or surety relationship. Professor McLaughlin, else-
where in this Symposium, discusses at length the approaches used to distinguish between
the two. See Gerald T. McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and Guaranties: An Exer-
cise in Cartography, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1139, 1145-53 (1993).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP at xvi (Tent. Draft No. 1).
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of whether some but not all of the rules articulated in the Restate-
ment could be applied to letters of credit. What, then, is the ra-
tionale for the exclusion of letters of credit?
This Article explores the applicability of the equitable doctrine
of subrogation, as developed in the Restatement of Suretyship, to
letter-of-credit transactions. Part II describes the current drafting
process involving the Restatement of Suretyship and its treatment
of letters of credit. It demonstrates that the present exclusion of
letters of credit is not necessarily justified by application of the
specific requisites for a suretyship transaction. Part III sets forth
the theory that the decision whether to categorize letter-of-credit
transactions as suretyship transactions should turn on the substan-
tive results that flow from such a characterization. It develops the
framework of distinguishing those rules that operate in the period
prior to payment or performance by the secondary obligor, and are
specifically rejected by letter-of-credit jurisprudence, from those
which operate in the postpayment period. Part IV examines the
reasons advanced for denying a right of subrogation in a letter-of-
credit transaction and concludes that the right of subrogation does
not violate any fundamental principles of letter-of-credit law Part
V looks at the right to subrogation in the letter-of-credit context
and the parties that attempt to assert such a right. Part VI exam-
ines the response to the subrogation issue in the Article 5 revision
process and concludes that the practical impact of the decision to
exclude letters of credit from the Restatement of Suretyship may
be minimized if the issue is appropriately addressed there.
II. THE CURRENT DRAFTING PROCESS: THE RESTATEMENT OF
SURETYSHIP AND ITS TREATMENT OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
The proposed Restatement (Third) of Suretyship explicitly ex-
cludes letters of credit from its coverage.' Although the comments
8. Id. § 3(2). In the first draft of the Restatement, letters of credit were not excluded
explicitly. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 3 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1991). In-
stead, a comment merely noted that "the issuer of a standby letter of credit is not a second-
ary obligor because its obligation is independent of the underlying obligation." Id. § 1 cmt.
j. To some extent, this comment improperly confused the independence principle with the
notion of "primary-secondary" obligations. See infra parts IV.D-E. The comment, which
was later revised and moved, continued: "To the extent that the law governing letters of
credit is silent as to an issue, however, suretyship law might potentially provide helpful
1090 [Vol. 34:1087
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to the Restatement acknowledge that the letter of credit fulfills
economic functions similar to those of suretyship devices, two rea-
sons are given for the exclusion. First, the law governing letters of
credit is "quite well developed [and no] good purpose would
be served by disturbing that state of affairs."9 This reason begs the
question of whether good reasons exist for applying (or not apply-
ing) such concepts as subrogation in a letter-of-credit context. In
this comment, the drafters of the Restatement have merely ex-
plained that they prefer to leave issues regarding letters of credit
to those primarily concerned with the law of letters of credit as
opposed to the law of suretyship. Second, the drafters supplied a
conceptual ground: "[A] standby letter of credit does not sat-
isfy all of the criteria [for a surety relationship] of § 1" of the
Restatement."0
Relationships giving rise to suretyship status11 under the Re-
statement generally involve three parties: the principal obligor,
who owes a duty of performance (the underlying obligation) to an-
other person (the obligee), and a secondary obligor (the surety),
who, pursuant to contract, promises to perform-in whole or in
part-the duty of the principal obligor to the obligee.' 3 The two
analogies." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 cmt. j (Prelim. Draft No. 1). Interest-
ingly, this portion of the comment was retained. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 3 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 1) ("To the extent that the law governing letters of credit is
silent as to a particular issue, however, suretyship law is a potential source of generally
appropriate analogies.").
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 3 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 1).
10. Id.
11. The Restatement of Suretyship eschews use of the terms "surety" or "surety relation-
ship," speaking instead of relationships giving rise to suretyship status. Id. at xv. The reason
for this somewhat awkward phrasing is that the term "surety" is often used in two ways. In
its narrow usage, it denotes a specific type of relationship in which the surety assumes joint
and several liability with the principal obligor; in its wider usage, it includes a variety of
transactions, including surety bonds, guaranties, and similar devices. See id. In this Article,
the term "surety" and "surety relationship" will be used in the broader sense unless the
context otherwise indicates.
12. Id. § l(1)(a).
13. Id. § 1(1)(b)(1). The secondary obligor may, instead of promising to perform, pledge
its property to the obligee to secure payment or performance of the underlying obligation,
id. § 1(b)(2), but that language generally would be inapplicable to a letter-of-credit trans-
action.
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most common contractual mechanisms resulting in suretyship sta-
tus are "suretyship" and "guaranty ",14
At the outset, a letter of credit may appear to fit within the
framework of the Restatement definition. The letter-of-credit
transaction generally involves three parties. 15 The applicant or cus-
tomer is the person who requests the issuer, generally a bank, to
issue the letter of credit. 6 The credit will allow a third person, the
beneficiary, to draw upon the credit by presentation of the re-
quired documents.' 7 In a conventional commercial letter-of-credit
transaction, the applicant will have a contract with the beneficiary
(the underlying obligation) requiring it to pay a sum for the deliv-
ery of certain goods; the letter of credit functions as a payment
mechanism, and by drawing on the letter of credit, the beneficiary
receives the amounts on the underlying contract.' 8 In a standby
letter-of-credit situation, the beneficiary is entitled to draw upon
default of the applicant in the underlying contract; payment of the
letter of credit functions in satisfaction of the applicant's per-
formance.' 9
The difficulty in bringing letters of credit under the Restate-
ment of Suretyship emerges with the requirement of subsection
1(1)(c). Under that subsection, a transaction gives rise to surety-
ship status only if "to the extent that the underlying obligation or
the secondary obligation is performed the obligee is not entitled to
performance of the other."20 Thus, in the traditional guaranty situ-
ation, full payment by the debtor or principal obligor would dis-
charge the guarantor's obligation to the creditor. Similarly, pay-
ment by the guarantor would discharge the debtor's obligation to
14. Id. § 1 cmt. c; see id. § 12. For an explanation of the difference between the two, see
infra note 74.
15. There may, however, be more. See mnfra part V
16. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1990) (defining "customer"). The term "customer," which is
used in the present version of Article 5, is being replaced with the term "applicant" in the
revisions to Article 5 in order to make the language conform with the Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits. See U.C.C. § 5-103(a)(2) & cmt. 3 (Members Consulta-
tive Group Draft No. 1, Sept. 1, 1992).
17. U.C.C. § 5-103(i)(d) (1990).
18. See, e.g., Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 428 A.2d 518, 523-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981).
19. Id.
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §1(1)(C) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
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the creditor as well. Presumably, in a letter-of-credit context, pay-
ment of a letter of credit (the secondary obligation) would dis-
charge the principal obligor or applicant of its obligation on the
underlying obligation for which the letter of credit was issued. The
difficulty is that payment or performance by the applicant or prin-
cipal obligor is not a defense to a draw under a letter of credit.21
Thus, the requirement of subsection 1(1) (c) of the present Restate-
ment technically is not met.
The requirement of subsection 1(1)(c) could be reworded, how-
ever, to track more closely prior definitions of suretyship 22 by pro-
viding that the obligee is entitled to retain only one performance
or satisfaction. Indeed, this was the formulation of the requirement
in the first draft of the Restatement of Suretyship.23 Arguably,
under this formulation, the letter of credit would satisfy the re-
quirement. If the applicant or principal obligor performs the un-
derlying obligation, but the creditor/obligee still draws on the let-
ter of credit, one could conclude that although the issuer cannot
rely on the full performance of the underlying obligation by the
principal obligor to dishonor the draw, the issuer (or the applicant)
can rely upon the dual payment to the obligee as a demonstration
21. Article 5 explicitly addresses the relationship between the letter-of-credit obligation
and the underlying transaction: "An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment
which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or
documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the cus-
tomer and the beneficiary." U.C.C. § 5-114(1).
22. The predecessor to the Restatement of Suretyship, the Restatement of Security, de-
fined suretyship as
the relation which exists where one person [the surety] has undertaken an obli-
gation and another person [the principal] is also under an obligation or other
duty to the obligee [the creditor], who is entitled to but one performance, and
as between the two who are bound [i.e., the surety and the principal], the
[principal] rather than the [surety] should perform.
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 (1941).
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1(C) (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1991) (giving
suretyship status when "the obligee is entitled to only one performance"). This requirement
was quickly revised into its present formulation, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 1(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 1) ("A 'secondary obligor' has suretyship status whenever to
the extent that the underlying obligation or the secondary obligation is performed the obli-
gee is not entitled to performance of the other "), and letters of credit were explicitly
excluded. Id. § 3(2). As the comment to the latter section noted, under the current formula-
tion, letters of credit will not give rise to suretyship status as "under the independence
principle of letters of credit, performance of the underlying obligation will not necessarily
discharge the issuer of a standby letter of credit." Id. § 3 cmt. b.
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of unjust enrichment. The obligee should not be entitled to retain
two separate payments or performances on the ground that each is
independent of the other but instead should be liable for restitu-
tion of the overpayment.24
III. CATEGORIZATION OF LETTER-OF-CREDIT TRANSACTIONS AS
SURETYSHIP TRANSACTIONS
Initially, it should be emphasized that one should not categorize
a transaction as a "suretyship" or "nonsuretyship" transaction in
the abstract. Rather, the focus should be on the consequences flow-
ing from the categorization. There are two important consequences
of suretyship status. First, the secondary obligor is given certain
rights against the principal obligor:25 the suretyship rights of exon-
eration,2 6 reimbursement, 7 and subrogation.28 Second, the second-
ary obligor's duties to the obligee are subject to defenses arising
out of the underlying transaction as well as out of the suretyship
status (the suretyship defenses).29 Yet, as the Introduction to the
Restatement of Suretyship notes: "[This Restatement] does not
obliterate differences between suretyship devices where they ex-
ist."30 The Restatement preserves the distinctions between various
24. As this Article discusses later, one of the main justifications advanced for denying
subrogation in the letter-of-credit context is that it would violate the principle of the inde-
pendence of the letter-of-credit obligation from the underlying obligation. See infra note 35
and accompanying text. Recognizing that a beneficiary should not simultaneously be able to
retain payments from both the applicant on the underlying obligation and the issuer on the
letter of credit demonstrates that the issuer's obligation on the letter of credit is not for all
purposes independent of the underlying obligation between the applicant and the benefi-
ciary. Although one cannot introduce evidence of performance of the underlying obligation
as a ground for failing to pay the letter of credit, demonstrating that there was no default on
the underlying obligation (i.e., that the obligee already received the performance it de-
served) and that the draw was made nonetheless should give rise to a potential action by
either the issuer or the applicant to recover the overpayment. If the two obligations were
completely independent as some seem to suggest, the obligee would be entitled to keep both
payments or performances under the two independent contractual relationships. The right
to recover the overpayment, however, is a postpayment remedy, not a prepayment remedy,
and therefore does not violate the independence principle.
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 13(1), 14 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
26. Id. § 17.
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 18-21 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
28. Id. §§ 23-27.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 13 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
30. Id. at xv.
1094
SURETYSHIP AND LETTERS OF CREDIT
types of sureties.31 Thus, not all sureties may assert suretyship de-
fenses, nor may all sureties claim a right of reimbursement or a
right of exoneration.
What, then, is the main dispute about classifying (or not classi-
fying) letters of credit as suretyship devices? Unfortunately, the
tendency in much of the literature and in many of the cases is to
resolve the definitional issue first-for example, categorizing the is-
suer of a letter of credit as a guarantor or surety-and then let the
substantive law implications flow from the characterization. The
thesis of this Article is that we must first examine the substantive
implications, such as the right of subrogation, and ask whether
they make sense in a letter-of-credit context, before we reach the
definitional issue. The Restatement of Suretyship already employs
this "functional approach"- "[S]ubstance rather than form deter-
mines whether suretyship status rights attach. '3 2
The first substantive result of classifying a transaction as a sure-
tyship device is that the secondary obligor may raise any defenses
that the principal obligor may have on the underlying obligation. 3
In addition, the secondary obligor may raise certain "suretyship
defenses," such as impairment of recourse, release or modification
of the underlying obligation, extension of time, impairment of col-
lateral, or other impairment of recourse.3 4
If these were the only results of categorizing a transaction as a
suretyship transaction, then the whole fabric of letter-of-credit law
would be violated by applying these results to letter-of-credit
transactions. Under the "independence principle" which is at the
heart of letter-of-credit law, courts consider the letter-of-credit
transaction independent of the underlying transaction. 5 Thus, the
31. The Restatement preserves distinctions between three-party and two-party relation-
ships, between consensual and nonconsensual sureties, between compensated and uncom-
pensated sureties, between commercial and noncommercial, and between consumer and
nonconsumer. See id.
32. Id. § 1 cmt. b. Undoubtedly the most vivid example of this functional approach in the
Restatement of Suretyship is its treatment of both the traditional surety and the guarantor
under the same set of rules, despite the fact that previously, distinctions frequently had
been made between the two. Id. cmt. c.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 28-32 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
34. Id. §§ 33-43.
35. See Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v. Continental Bank, 918 F.2d 1312, 1315 (7th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that .the independence principle prevents the issuer from looking outside
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issuer must honor a documentary tender conforming to the re-
quirements of the credit "regardless of whether the goods or docu-
ments conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract
between the customer and the beneficiary "" Similarly, the issuer's
obligation to the applicant does not include responsibility "for per-
formance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction
between the customer and the beneficiary " The fact that the
beneficiary may have breached the underlying contract and thus
given the applicant a defense to the underlying contract is not a
defense available to the issuer. "Only staunch recognition of this
principle by the issuers and the courts will give letters of credit the
continued vitality that arises from the certainty and speed of pay-
ment under letters of credit. '38
Letters of credit are used to ensure prompt and expeditious pay-
ment to the beneficiary Thus, the issuer is denied the ability to
raise defenses arising from the underlying contract.3 9 Similarly, the
issuer should be denied the advantages of other "incidents of sure-
tyship status" that operate in any way to frustrate the prompt
payment mechanism. Moreover, the issuer should not be able to
assert the suretyship defenses, the impact of which denies the ben-
eficiary a swift, up-front payment mechanism, and shifts the bur-
den to the beneficiary to sue the applicant on the underlying con-
tract. Indeed, the focus of the concerns about the independence of
the letter-of-credit transaction are in the prepayment period,
where any rule or principle that operates to delay or frustrate the
payment mechanism should be rejected.
the documents); Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586,
590 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that the independence principle is "the cornerstone of letter of
credit law"), on reh'g, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988); Arbest Constr. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 777 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The issuer is immune from responsibilities to
police the underlying transaction because it lacks control over it, or possibly even knowledge
of it."); Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1285, 1286
(9th Cir. 1974) (stating that the purpose of the letter of credit is to assure payment "cheaply
by eliminating the need for the issuer to police the underlying contract"); Page v. First Nat'l
Bank (In re Page), 18 B.R. 713, 717 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that the commercial vitality of
the letter of credit is that the promise by the issuer is independent of the letter of credit).
36. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1990).
37. Id. § 5-109(1)(a).
38. U.C.C. § 5-102 cmt. I (Members Consultative Group Draft No. 1, Sept. 1, 1992).
39. This point is specifically recognized in the latest drafts of Revised Article 5. Id. § 5-
102(f).
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Yet, to the extent these suretyship principles apply in the
postpayment period, their application would not interfere with the
purpose of letters of credit: providing a swift payment mechanism
that makes the beneficiary the stakeholder in the event of disputes
on the underlying contract and shifts the burden to the applicant
to seek relief. The second set of rights that flow from suretyship
status are those of the secondary obligor against the principal obli-
gor-more specifically, the rights to exoneration 4 and subroga-
tion.1 A third right of suretyship status, the right to reimburse-
ment,42 is already available to issuers under Article 5.43 Indeed,
this statutory grant of the right of reimbursement to issuers can be
viewed as an acknowledgment that some of the rights of suretyship
status are applicable in the letter-of-credit context. Although the
unavailability of the right of subrogation to issuers of letters of
credit is often justified on the ground that such a right is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the independence principle of letter-of-
credit law, this Article argues that allowing resort to the right of
subrogation in no way compromises the independence principle.
The right to subrogation is a postpayment right'that does not in
any way affect the commercial vitality of the letter of credit. This
Article furthermore argues that the theory behind the right of sub-
rogation is as applicable in a letter-of-credit context as it is in any
suretyship context.
IV THEORIES FOR DENYING SUBROGATION
A. Article 5 Is Exclusive Source of Letter-of-Credit Law
Some courts, in denying subrogation, have argued that Article 5
of the Uniform Commercial Code is the sole source of letter-of-
credit law, and thus it is improper to import subrogation princi-
ples.44 This argument relies in part on comments to Article 5 that
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 17 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 23-27 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
42. Id. §§ 18-21.
43. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1990).
44. E.g., Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 362
(3d Cir. 1992) (Article 5, "viewed in its entirety, evinces an intent to keep the law of guaran-
tee and the law of letters of credit separate.").
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distinguish between letters of credit and guaranties; 45 to that ex-
tent, this formal argument ignores the black letter of Article 5 and
other comments that underscore the limited scope of the article
and the nonexclusive nature of its provisions.4 The argument also
fails to recognize that Article 5 implies in its comments that subro-
gation might be available in certain situations not within the black
letter of the Code itself.47
It bears noting that prior to the enactment of original Article 5,
the question of the availability of subrogation in a letter-of-credit
context was never squarely raised,48 so that it is highly unlikely
that fears about improper subrogation prompted the language dis-
tinguishing guaranty law More likely, as a matter of drafting in-
tent, the doctrine of subrogation was unaffected by the passage of
Article 5.49
45. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-101 official cmt. ("The other source of law respecting letters of
credit is the law of contracts with occasional unfortunate excursions into the law of guar-
anty."); td. § 5-103 official cmt. 3 ("The issuer is not a guarantor of the performance of the
[ ] underlying transactions."); id. § 5-109 official cmt. 1 ("[T]he issuer receives compensa-
tion for a payment service rather than for a guaranty of performance.").
46. Section 5-102(3) states:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of
credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereaf-
ter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require,
imply or negate application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not
provided for
Id. § 5-102(3); see also id. § 5-101 official cmt. (speaking of "further development of letters
of credit"); id. § 5-102 official cmt. (noting that the rules of Article 5 are not exhaustive of
the law applicable to letters of credit); id. official cmt. 2 ("[N]o statute can effectively or
wisely codify all the possible law of letters of credit without stultifying further development
of this useful financing device.").
47. Id. § 5-109 official cmt. 1 (recognizing that the issuer may be subrogated to the rights
of the applicant against the beneficiary in a "proper case").
48. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text; see also Peter R. Jarvis, Standby Let-
ters of Credit: Issuers' Subrogation and Assignment Rights, 9 UCC L.J. 356, 375-77 (1977).
49. Indeed, the relationship between subrogation notions and the Uniform Commercial
Code has been extensively litigated in a different context: whether subrogation rights sur-
vive the enactment of Article 9 and whether a subrogee has rights superior to those of a
secured party. As one court observed, equitable subrogation is "too hardy a plant to be
uprooted by a Code which speaks around but not to the issue." National Shawmut Bank v.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843, 849 (1st Cir. 1969); see also Mid Continent
Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 531 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Okla. 1975) ("All of the
still viable decisions hold that the doctrine of equitable subrogation in suretyship cases has
not been affected by the adoption of the Code.").
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More importantly, this argument does not address whether Arti-
cle 5 should allow subrogation in the letter-of-credit context. The
tendency to look solely to Article 5 for governing principles may
reflect the concern, discussed below, that wholesale importation of
principles of suretyship will undermine the commercial uniqueness
and legitimacy of letters of credit ° To preserve the integrity of
letter-of-credit law against possible strangulation by the encroach-
ment of the hardy vine of equity,5 1 it may be preferable to keep the
law governing letter-of-credit transactions within one statutory
framework, rendering unnecessary resort to extraneous nonstatu-
tory authorities such as the Restatement of Suretyship. Ulti-
mately, however, whether the issue is addressed in the
Restatement or in Article 5, the question still remains whether sub-
rogation should be available in a letter-of-credit context.
B. Failure to Request Security
Some courts have refused to grant a right of subrogation on the
theory that the party seeking subrogation could have demanded
the rights to which it seeks subrogation, 2 either from the person
whose rights are being asserted or from the person against whom
rights are sought.53 In other words, if the party could have asked
for subrogation at the time the letter-of-credit transaction was en-
tered into but did not, it is doomed. As one court said, "There is
no equitable reason to grant [applicant] protection which neither it
50. See infra part IV.E.
51. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., In re Agrownautics, 125 B.R. 350, 353 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (involving an
issuer who "chose not to bargain for the protection of the [beneficiary's] mortgage, presuma-
bly being content with the credit worthiness of the [applicant]"); Beach v. First Union Nat'l
Bank (In re Carley Capital Group), 119 B.R. 646, 650 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (denying equitable
subrogation when the plaintiffs demanded consideration for their actions and could have
required security but did not).
53. As one court noted:
Furthermore, there is no equitable reason to grant such additional rights to the
plaintiffs in this case since they could have achieved the same protection by
contract. They could have obtained such security directly in their contract
with the debtor through a secondary security interest in the collateral granted
to the creditor, or they could have obtained such security by requiring the as-
signment of excess security rights under the terms of the letter of credit when
contracting for its issuance.
Carley Capital, 119 B.R. at 650.
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nor [the issuer] sought. '54 On the other hand, some courts deny
subrogation on the ground that no privity exists between the par-
ties, i.e., between the person seeking subrogation and the person
against whom subrogation is sought.55 Thus, the party seeking sub-
rogation is in an untenable position: if privity existed, the party
will be denied recovery for failing to request the security; if privity
did not exist, it may be denied recovery even though it could not
have requested the security
The emphasis on what the person seeking subrogation could or
could not have requested is misplaced. 56 First, as has been ob-
served elsewhere, parties generally do not expect that standby let-
ters of credit, as opposed to commercial letters of credit, will be
drawn upon, so their failure to address issues such as reimburse-
ment or collateralization in their underlying agreements may not
be surprising.57 More importantly, however, as the Restatement of
Suretyship notes:
Subrogation does not spring from contract although it may be
confirmed or qualified by contract. Rather, it is a rule that the
law adopts to compel the eventual satisfaction of an obligation
by the one who ought to pay it. Subrogation is often called
an equitable assignment, or an assignment by operation of law .5
Indeed, in most cases involving a surety or guarantor seeking to be
subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the debtor, the
surety or guarantor arguably could have demanded that the debtor
54. Agrownautics, 125 B.R. at 353.
55. See, e.g., In re Munzenrieder Corp., 58 B.R. 228 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986). The appli-
cant, who reimbursed the issuer, sought subrogation to the rights of the beneficiary against
the debtor on an underlying contract. Id. at 230. The court, in denying subrogation, empha-
sized the fact that the issuer had no direct or indirect interest in the discharge of the
debtor's debt to the beneficiary. Id. at 231.
56. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Craig (In re Glade Springs, Inc.), 826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir.
1987) (granting subrogation despite the failure of the confirmer to demand security).
57. In re Minnesota Kicks, Inc., 48 B.R. 93, 103-04 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (citing Harry
J. Arnold, Jr. & Edward Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit: The Controversy Con-
tinues, 10 UCC L.J. 272, 279-80 (1978); Bernard S. Wheble, "Problem Children" Stand-by
Letters of Credit and Simple First Demand Guarantees, 24 Amiz. L. REv. 301, 302 (1982)).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 23 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993). Some-
times, distinctions are drawn between "legal subrogation," which arises out of equitable con-
siderations, and "conventional" subrogation, which is founded upon some understanding,
agreement, or contract. See Jarvis, supra note 48, at 365 n.48.
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give it security for its undertaking, or it could have asked that the
creditor requesting the bond or guaranty agree to assign any rights
the creditor had against the debtor in the event of payment by the
surety or guarantor 9.5  A per se rule denying subrogation to any
person who could have but did not demand security would gut the
application of subrogation in most ordinary commercial trans-
actions.
This is not to say that the ability of a creditor to protect itself ex
ante may not be taken into consideration in determining the equi-
ties of subrogation in any particular context.6 0 Thus, when an is-
suer has the personal guaranties of three persons and mortgages on
three other properties to secure its claim for reimbursement, al-
lowing subrogation to the rights of a beneficiary who had a first
mortgage on other property, which the issuer never requested, may
be inequitable.6
59. Of course, one might argue that frequently guarantors are noncommercial entities or
that they lack bargaining power comparable to that enjoyed by the creditor, whereas letter-
of-credit issuers are generally banks that can set the terms under which they will issue any
particular credit. That is not always the case, however. See, e.g., In re Sensor Systems, Inc.,
79 B.R. 623 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting that a bank loaning one million dollars to the
debtor demanded a security interest in all the debtor's assets as well as letters of credit in
the bank's favor from sixteen individuals).
60. In Tudor Development Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 968
F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1992), for example, the issuer of a standby letter of credit payable upon
the failure of the applicant to complete certain site improvements had taken an assignment
of the proceeds of a construction bond covering those site improvements. Id. at 359. The
applicant defaulted and a draw was made, but the proceeds of the site-improvement bond
were insufficient to reimburse the issuer. Id. The issuer then sought subrogation to the cus-
tomer's proceeds under other bonds covering specific buildings. Id. In such a case, the is-
suer's demand that the site-improvement bond be assigned, combined with its failure to
demand that the other bonds be assigned and the fact that these other bonds were not
related to the specific default giving rise to the draw under the letter, could be sufficient to
warrant a denial of a right to subrogation. See id. at 363-64 n.4 (Garth, J.) (suggesting an
addition to the majority opinion).
An argument may be made, however, that irrespective of the equities this is not a tradi-
tional subrogation case. The issuer was not asserting the rights of the beneficiary paid pur-
suant to the letter of credit, nor was it seeking to assert the rights of its customer against
the beneficiary or other wrongdoer. Instead, it was seeking to assert its customer's rights on
unrelated third-party contracts.
61. See, e.g, Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Economic Enters., Inc. (In re Economic
Enters., Inc.), 44 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (denying subrogation in such a situation,
but also holding that the independence principle precluded subrogation). Under the general
theory of marshalling, the court in such a situation might require the issuer to resort to its
other guaranties and mortgages to satisfy its claim before granting subrogation rights.
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C. Letters of Credit Are Not Guaranties or Surety
Letters of credit are now being used in many of the same situa-
tions in which guaranties and surety bonds were traditionally used.
In many respects, the willingness of creditors to accept letters of
credit in place of guaranties or bonds is an indication of the fact
that a letter of credit fulfills many of the functions traditionally
performed by these other devices. In addition, the acceptability of
these letters of credit may demonstrate awareness on the part of
some creditors that the security they get from a letter of credit is
greater than that from a guaranty or bond: the creditor will receive
payment upon presentation of the documents without having to
demonstrate actual default or performance of the underlying con-
tract; the creditor takes free of any defenses a surety or guarantor
might have; the creditor's modification of the underlying contract
or release of the debtor does not discharge the letter of credit; and
if any litigation does stem from the underlying contract, the credi-
tor remains the stakeholder and retains the proceeds of the letter
of credit until the claimant (generally the debtor) proves its right
to recover based on the underlying contract.
Many courts that have confronted the subrogation issue have fo-
cused on the similarities and differences between letters of credit
and guaranties. Those courts that have found a right to subroga-
tion often stress the similarities between the two. 2 Others, in de-
nying subrogation, have stressed that, although the letter of credit
may perform a function similar to that performed by a bond or a
guaranty, a letter of credit is distinct from a guaranty and is there-
fore subject to a different body of law 6 Indeed, the Official Com-
62. See, e.g., In re National Serv. Lines, Inc., 80 B.R. 144, 145 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)
(reasoning that a bank which pays a debtor's obligation pursuant to a letter of credit "func-
tions in substance like a guarantor or surety of the debtor's obligation"); Sensor Systems, 79
B.R. at 626 (noting that the issuer of standby letter is "logically characterized as a 'guaran-
tor' or a 'co-debtor' "); In re Minnesota Kicks, Inc., 48 B.R. 93, 104-05 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985) (granting subrogation to guarantors but not issuers of credits "would be no more than
an exercise in honoring form over substance").
63. See, e.g., Tudor Development, 968 F.2d at 362 (holding that despite "superficial simi-
larities between guarantees and letters of credit, their 'legal' characteristics remain quite
distinct and thus the remedies available should remain distinct as well"); Berliner Handels-
Und Frankfurter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re East Tex. Steel Facilities,
Inc.), 117 B.R. 235, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that numerous differences between
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ments to Article 5 stress the differences between the two."4 Accord-
ing to those courts that emphasize the differences rather than the
similarities, because subrogation is a doctrine that applies to guar-
anties and bonds, it cannot be invoked in the letter-of-credit
context.
Yet the fact that standby letters of credit are similar to or dis-
tinguishable from guaranties begs the issue. 5 The doctrine of sub-
a letter of credit and a guaranty "prohibit the issuer from sharing a guarantor's subro-
gative rights").
64. See U.C.C. § 5-101 official cmt. (1990) ("The other source of law respecting letters of
credit is the law of contracts with occasional unfortunate excursions into the law of guar-
anty."); id. § 5-103 official cmt. 3 (stating that an issuer is not a guarantor); id. § 5-117
official cmt. (stating that an issuer acts as a principal, not as agent for its customer, and
engages its own credit).
65. The use of standby letters of credit in situations in which traditionally guaranties or
bonds were used was the original impetus to the suggestion that letters of credit were suffi-
ciently similar to such surety relationships to justify application of the doctrine of subroga-
tion. Such arguments are somewhat misleading in that they fail to recognize that even com-
mercial letters of credit share one critical element in common with guaranties: under a
commercial letter of credit the issuer, upon honoring the presentation, typically satisfies the
debt owed by its customer to the beneficiary in the underlying commercial transaction.
Thus, any of the arguments made about the propriety of subrogation in a standby letter-of-
credit context apply equally in a conventional commercial letter-of-credit context.
Most of the discussion of subrogation in a letter-of-credit context has occurred in discus-
sions of standby as opposed to commercial letters of credit. Several theories may explain
this distinction. First, standby letters of credit involve greater risk than do traditional let-
ters of credit. See Boris Kozolchyk, The Emerging Law of Standby Letters of Credit and
Bank Guarantees, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 342 (1982) ("The issuance of improperly secured
standbys embodies a greater degree of risk of unreimbursed payment for the issuing or con-
firming bank than does the commercial letter of credit."); Edward L. Symons, Jr., Letters of
Credit, 54 TUL. L. REv. 338, 343 (1980); Michael Stern, Note, The Independence Rule in
Standby Letters of Credit, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 218, 222 (1985). In part the greater risk is due
to the absence of a bill of lading giving the bank a claim to the goods in the event of non-
payment by the applicant. Without that security, the issuer has recourse only to the appli-
cant based on its reimbursement right; any right to collateral must be based on a contrac-
tual grant of a security interest or on an assertion of a right to subrogation to any security
interest granted the beneficiary. With the growth in use of standby letters of credit, then,
issuers arguably need to resort to subrogation in more contexts than in the traditional let-
ter-of-credit situation.
Second, standby letters of credit, far more so than conventional commercial letters of
credit, resemble guaranties and are used in place of guaranties. Thus, not surprisingly, com-
parisons between the two lead to discussions of whether certain rights of guarantors, such as
the right to subrogation, extend to standby letters of credit. Nonetheless, the doctrine of
subrogation may be equally important in a conventional commercial letter-of-credit context.
See, e.g., East Texas Steel, 117 B.R. 235; National Service Lines, 80 B.R. 144 (upholding an
issuer's subrogation claim to a creditor's priority claim in bankruptcy without determining
its basis on a commercial or standby letter of credit).
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rogation is an equitable doctrine which applies to transactions
other than the typical guaranty or bond.68 As one leading treatise
on suretyship observed, "Subrogation is not limited in its applica-
tion to transactions in suretyship. Whenever one pays the debt of
another, although not obligated to do so, if the payment was neces-
sary for the protection of his own interests, the equity of subroga-
tion arises."6  Indeed, the Restatement of Suretyship itself is not
limited to guaranties or bonds, but adopts a "broad, functional
manner that emphasizes the substance of relationships rather than
their form."6 8 Thus, the recognition that a letter of credit is not a
guaranty or bond should not preclude application of the equitable
doctrine of subrogation in a letter-of-credit context.69
D Primary Obligation of Issuer
Courts and commentators rejecting the application of subroga-
tion notions in the letter-of-credit context frequently stress that
the duty of the issuer of the letter of credit is "primary" and not
"secondary" as in the case of the guarantor's obligation.7 0 These
writers seldom explain either what is meant by "primary" or "sec-
ondary" obligations, or why that distinction is at all relevant to the
application of subrogation principles. As a result, use of "primary-
66. Thus, the articulation of the equitable doctrine of subrogation in the Restatement of
Restitution does not limit its application to the strict guaranty situation or the suretyship
situation. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937); see also Compania Anomma Venezo-
lana de Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692, 697 (5th Cir.) (stating that sub-
rogation is a mechanism universally applied in new and unknown circumstances), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 942 (1962).
67. ARTHUR A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 11.1 (5th ed. 1951); see also LAURENCE
P SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 47, at 205 (1950) ("Any person who,
being obligated on the debt of another has paid the debt, is entitled to be subrogated to the
creditor's rights against the debtor.").
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP at xvi (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
69. Chemical Bank v. Craig (In re Glade Springs, Inc.), 826 F.2d 440, 442 n.4 (6th Cir.
1987); In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199, 208 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (noting that
neither equity nor 11 U.S.C. § 509(a) (1988) requires that a party seeking subrogation be a
surety or guarantor).
70. Many of these courts cite, as a prerequisite to application of the doctrine of restitu-
tion, the requirement that the person seeking subrogation not have been primarily liable for
the debt. See, e.g., Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d
357 (3d Cir. 1992); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United Penn Bank, 524 A.2d 958,
963 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (citing a five-prong test for availability of subrogation), allocatur de-
nied, 536 A.2d 1333 (Pa. 1987).
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secondary" terminology often obfuscates rather than clarifies the
issue of whether subrogation should be recognized in a letter-of-
credit context.7
The confusion stems in part from the failure to reconcile the use
of "primary-secondary" terminology in two different and distinct
contexts: 1) the context of determining whether a person who
claims the right is entitled to subrogation, or whether the person
was paying a debt completely separate and distinct from the debt
giving rise to the claim of subrogation; and 2) the letter-of-credit
context, in which courts have attempted to distinguish between
letter-of-credit transactions and other transactions, such as guar-
anty or suretyship transactions, or to differentiate standby letters
of credit from conventional commercial letters.72 In each context,
the "primary-secondary" dichotomy serves a different purpose,
and yet the distinction is often recited indiscriminately without
any complete analysis of what is meant.73
Most of these analyses do little to demonstrate the inapplicabil-
ity of notions of subrogation to letters of credit; to the contrary,
they demonstrate that the arguments against such application are
more rhetorical than substantive. An initial look at how the terms
"secondary" and "primary" may be used to describe the obliga-
tions of the issuer and the applicant will demonstrate that the dis-
tinguishing feature of a letter-of-credit transaction is not which of
the two parties has the primary obligation, but the fact that the
issuer's obligation is sufficiently independent of the underlying ob-
ligation so that the issuer cannot dishonor a draw simply because
of defenses the applicant may have on the underlying obligation. A
71. The confusing nature of the "primary-secondary" dichotomy has been noted by
others. See Tudor Develelopment, 968 F.2d at 365-66 (Becker, J., dissenting); Jarvis, supra
note 48, at 366 n.50; Kozolchyk, supra note 65, at 321 n.9.
72. Kozolchyk, supra note 65, at 321 n.9.
73. It is interesting to note that the "primary-secondary" terminology has also been used
within the area of suretyship law to distinguish a surety, whose obligation is deemed to be
secondary and unconditional upon default by the principal obligor, from a guarantor, whose
obligation is deemed primary and conditional upon default. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1986); SIMPSON, supra
note 67, § 4, at 6-8, § 5, at 8-9. The distinction between the two, however, is minimal: when
sued, a guarantor has a defense that the principal has not yet defaulted, a defense that is
unavailable to a surety. Rhode Island Hospital Trust, 789 F.2d at 78; United States v. Frisk,
675 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing the distinction but noting it was of no consequence to
rights after payment).
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further examination of the use of the terms "secondary" and "pri-
mary" as factors in the determination of whether the equitable
remedy of subrogation is available will further demonstrate that,
according to the usage of those terms in the context of subrogation,
the letter-of-credit issuer's obligation is secondary, and therefore
subrogation should not be denied.
1. Different Uses of the "Primary-Secondary"
Liability Dichotomy
a. Temporal Notion
The statement that the issuer is "primarily liable" could be used
in one temporal sense to mean that the issuer must pay upon pres-
entation of a proper demand complying with the terms of the
credit without any prior demand upon or default by the debtor. Of
course, one could argue that in a standby situation, the issuer is
not "primarily liable" because a demand will not be made under
the letter until there has been a default by the debtor, even though
under the independence principle, inquiry into whether default has
actually occurred is precluded. Whether or not the issuer is "pri-
marily liable" in this temporal sense, however, subrogation should
not be precluded for this reason.
Under the Restatement of Suretyship, suretyship status arises
(and the right to subrogation may accrue) whether the secondary
obligor is unconditionally liable along with the principal obligor or
is only conditionally liable after default by the.principal obligor.74
Thus, suretyship status may arise (and the right to subrogation
may accrue) whether the surety's obligation to pay was uncondi-
tional or conditional upon default by the principal. In other words,
suretyship status may arise, and thus subrogation may be available
to a surety, whether the surety's obligation was "primary" or "sec-
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 cmt. I (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992). The Re-
statement thus eliminates the distinction that exists in some states between a "surety" obli-
gation (in which the promise of the surety is unconditional yet is a secondary, collateral
obligation) and the "guaranty" obligation (in which the guarantor's obligation is conditional
yet is deemed to be independent and primary). See, e.g., Rhode Island Hospital Trust, 789
F.2d at 77; Griswold v. Wells Aluminum, Moultrie, Inc., 274 S.E.2d 7, 8 (Ga. 1980); Indiana
Univ. v. Indiana Bonding & Sur. Co., 416 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (Ind. 1981); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 492 A.2d 1306, 1309 (Md. 1985) (giving a right to subrogation
to a surety whose obligation is primary with the obligor, although unconditional).
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ondary" in the temporal sense. Thus, whether an issuer is "primar-
ily liable" in this temporal sense should be equally irrelevant to
the determination of whether subrogation is available in letter-of-
credit transactions. 75
One factual situation embraced by the Restatement of Surety-
ship illustrates the application of the Restatement and the availa-
bility of its subrogation principles to instances in which the surety
is "primarily liable" in this temporal sense. If the owner of encum-
bered property transfers it to a transferee who assumes the mort-
gage, under the Restatement the transferee would be the primary
obligee and the original owner the secondary obligee because, as
between the two of them, the transferee has agreed to be primarily
liable.76 Yet, when payments are due under the mortgage, the
mortgagee/obligee may make a demand upon the original owner/
secondary obligor without a prior demand upon the transferee/
principal obligor. Thus, in a temporal sense, the owner's obligation
may be deemed primary, but in the determination of who, as be-
75. It should be noted that the position of the Restatement of Suretyship that a transac-
tion may give rise to suretyship status (and the right to subrogation) even though the under-
taking of the secondary obligor is unconditional, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 1 cmt. 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1), is not universally accepted. In the case of In re St. Clair
Supply Co., 100 B.R. 263 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989), noninsiders had agreed to provide collat-
eral for a letter of credit issued on behalf of a Chapter 11 debtor to its suppliers to secure
the debtor's reimbursement obligation. Id. at 265. In essence, the noninsiders were "guaran-
teeing" the applicant's reimbursement obligation by providing the collateral. Under the
agreement, the issuer was entitled to use the collateral to satisfy the debt without first pro-
ceeding against the debtor. Id. at 265-66. When the issuer proceeded against the collateral
after honoring the credit, the noninsiders claimed subrogation to the issuer's rights against
the debtor. Id. at 266. As the court noted:
Inasmuch as a surety is a primary obligor, there is no claim to which [the
noninsider] could be subrogated. That [the noninsider] is a-primary obligor to
[the issuer] is made clear by the language of the Guaranty and Suretyship per-
mitting [the issuer] to proceed against [the insider] without first attempting to
collect from Debtors.
Id. at 267.
This outcome may be based on the traditional distinction drawn in some jurisdictions
between a "suretyship arrangement" and a guaranty. A "surety" was seen as having a "pri-
mary" obligation to perform coequal to that of the obligor, whereas the guarantor's obliga-
tion was "secondary." See, e.g., Rhode Island Hospital Trust, 789 F.2d at 77 ("[Surety] is
used in a narrow sense to indicate a direct, primary obligation to pay someone else's debt, as
distinguished from the secondary, collateral obligation of a 'guarantor.' "). This distinction
is eliminated under the Restatement of Suretyship.
-76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § I cmt. m, illus. 18-19 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
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tween the owner and the transferee, should be liable, the trans-
feree's obligation is primary If the owner made the payment upon
such a demand, it would be entitled to be subrogated to both the
mortgagee's rights against the transferee and the right to be subro-
gated to its mortgage, upon total satisfaction of the mortgage debt.
Similarly, an accommodation comaker of a note is obligated to
pay a note holder even if the holder did not first seek recourse
against the accommodated note maker; in this sense, the accommo-
dation comaker is primarily liable.7 7 Nonetheless, as between the
accommodation and accommodated comakers, the latter bears the
ultimate obligation to pay, and thus the law recognizes that the
accommodation comaker is entitled to subrogation under general
equitable principles.7 8 Thus, the "temporal" notion of primary and
secondary obligations should be irrelevant in determining whether
the right of subrogation is available.
b. Direct Liability
A second possible use of the "primary-secondary" terminology is
to demonstrate that the issuer is arguably "primarily liable" be-
cause it has a direct liability to the beneficiary, based on the letter
of credit, and that no one else is liable on the same obligation. The
issuer is thus paying "its" debt and not any debt arising from the
underlying obligation. As one court stated:
[W]hile the issuing bank in the letter of credit situation may be
secondarily liable in a temporal sense, since its obligation to pay
does not arise until after its customer fails to satisfy some obli-
gation, it is satisfying its own absolute and primary obligation to
make payment rather than satisfying an obligation of its
customer."9
77. U.C.C. § 3-419(b) (1990).
78. In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (citing
Adams v. Parker (In re Parker), 10 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981)); Anna Nat'l
Bank v. Wingate, 381 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Bank of New Jersey v. Pulim, 476
A.2d 797, 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
79. Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 362 (3d
Cir. 1992); see also Beach v. First Union Nat'l Bank (In re Carley Capital Group), 118 B.R.
982, 991 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.) (reasoning that the issuer paid its own debt, not that of an-
other), aff'd, 119 B.R. 646 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Berliner Handels-Und Frankfurter Bank v.
East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 B.R. 235, 241
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (noting that the issuer's obligation is primary and independent of
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Again, this notion of "primary liability" should not preclude op-
eration of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. First, even though
the obligation of the issuer is based on the letter of credit, the pay-
ment itself may still satisfy an underlying obligation of its appli-
cant, whether the letter is a standby letter of credit or a conven-
tional commercial letter of credit. Thus, at the same time the
issuer satisfies its own obligation, it is also satisfying the obligation
of its applicant.
Second, a party that did not have a direct obligation to pay the
creditor, or an obligation of its own, would run the risk that upon
payment subrogation would be denied because the party acted as a
mere volunteer.80 Indeed, the letter-of-credit obligation of the is-
suer is a clear demonstration that the issuer is under a duty to
make the payment and is not acting as a volunteer, and hence
should not be denied subrogation on that basis.81
Third, in most traditional suretyship situations, in which the
guarantor or surety enters into a contractual undertaking with the
obligee, one can argue that the guarantor, in making payment, is
also satisfying its own primary obligation to make payment. A
surety that issues a bond to a beneficiary is primarily liable in this
sense: its liability is based on an independent contractual under-
taking running to the beneficiary, and no one else is liable on that
the customer's rights); In re Munzenrieder Corp., 58 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986)
(holding that the issuer has no direct or indirect interest in the discharge of the debtor's
debt to the beneficiary).
80. Under traditional principles of equity, no right to reimbursement or subrogation ac-
crues if the person acts officiously. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 cmt. b (1937). Thus,
subrogation is not accorded to a volunteer. Carley Capital, 118 B.R. at 992; Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150, 152
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); Munzenrieder, 58 B.R. at 231.
81. On the other hand, where the plaintiff is not officious, and he uses his property
or his property is used in discharging the obligation of another or a lien upon
another's property, he is entitled to reimbursement and is entitled to the rem-
edy of subrogation He is not officious where he was under a duty to
make the payment, as for example where he was a surety.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 cmt. b (citation omitted); see also In re Minnesota
Kicks, Inc., 48 B.R. 93, 105 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (holding that an applicant who had a
reimbursement obligation to a letter-of-credit issuer was not acting as a volunteer and was
entitled to subrogation to the beneficiary's rights against the debtor).
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obligation. s2 Yet, a surety is entitled to subrogation under the Re-
statement of Suretyship.83 Similarly, an insurance company is lia-
ble on the basis of a contractual undertaking to its insured-a con-
tractual obligation for which no one else is liable-yet the insurer
may be subrogated to the rights of its insured against third parties
not privy to that undertaking. The Restatement of Suretyship rec-
ognizes that a suretyship obligation may arise contractually, in a
contractual undertaking between the surety and the obligee to
which the principal obligor is not privy or of which the principal
obligor may be unaware.84 It similarly recognizes that the obliga-
tion of the surety may be different from the obligation of the
debtor.8 5 To the extent that the secondary obligation arises by an
independent contract and is different and even more onerous than
the underlying obligation, the secondary obligor appears to have a
direct liability for which no one else is liable. Thus, attempts to
draw distinctions between letters of credit and other suretyship de-
vices on this basis appear misguided.
c. Inapplicability of Defenses
One could argue that the issuer is "primarily liable" in that its
liability is not derivative of the applicant/customer's liability, and
therefore the issuer cannot take advantage of any defenses the ap-
plicant/customer/account debtor may have on the underlying obli-
gation.86 As one court stated: "In the letter of credit context, the
statement that the issuer's obligation to honor a letter of credit is
primary goes to the issue of whether the issuer can avoid its obliga-
82. The surety obligation was often labeled "primary" and independent. See, e.g., Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1986);
supra note 75.
83. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 2(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992) (stating
that a suretyship obligation may arise from a contract between the secondary obligor and
the obligee); id. § 1(2)(d) & cmt. I (stating that the principal obligor does not need to know
of the secondary obligation).
85. Id. § 1 cmts. j-k (stating that a secondary obligation need not be identical to the
underlying obligation and may be more burdensome than the underlying obligation).
86. Berliner Handels-Und Frankfurter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re East
Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 B.R. 235, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (denying subrogation
on the ground that letters of credit differ from guaranties because, inter alia, "the guarantor
can set up defenses which the principal has against a creditor, but an issuer may not assert
the customer's defenses against the beneficiary").
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tion by relying on underlying transaction defenses." '87 As two noted
commentators have stated:
[T]he guarantor can often set up defenses that the principal
debtor has against the creditor. An issuer of a letter of credit
cannot do so. In that sense the issuer's obligation to the benefi-
ciary (the creditor) is said to be primary, i.e., not subject to the
defenses the debtor might have against the creditor.88
Using the "primary-secondary" distinction in this manner im-
properly imports it into the discussion of subrogation. Subrogation
deals with situations in which one entity already has paid the debt
of another and seeks to assert remedies its transferee may have
had against another. On the other hand, the "primary-secondary"
distinction is being used here in the prepayment period to deter-
mine what defenses, if any, an obligor may raise to its obligation to
pay.8 9
In this respect, the notion that the issuer is "primarily liable" is
a somewhat misleading statement of the independence principle,
that the issuer's liability is independent of the underlying obliga-
tion of the customer, and the issuer must therefore pay indepen-
dent of any defenses to the underlying obligation."' Yet the confu-
sion of the two statements is a clue to the fear that confronts some
letter-of-credit aficionados: if the obligation of an issuer is deemed
"secondary" for purposes of permitting the issuer to be subrogated
87. In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199, 205 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
88. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 19-2, at 814 (3d ed. 1988); see also Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1988) (holding that a guarantor can set up the defenses of a principal, but the issuer, whose
obligation is primary, cannot).
89. See Valley Vue, 123 B.R. at 210 (noting that the requirement that a person seeking
subrogation possess the right to assert defenses based on the underlying obligation is a
"novel but nonsensical requirement in the subrogation context").
90. As one court explained:
It would appear, therefore, that the notion that an issuer's obligation to honor
the letter of credit is a "primary obligation" should be interpreted to mean
that, under the independence principle, the issuer may not avoid its obligation
to honor the credit by identifying deficiencies in underlying contracts or by
otherwise asserting defenses that are typically available to parties who are gen-
erally considered to be "secondarily liable" such as guarantors and sureties.
Id. at 206. For a discussion of the implication of the independence principle in the subroga-
tion context, see infra part IV.E.
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to the rights of the beneficiary against the applicant, then soon the
obligation of the issuer will be deemed "secondary" for purposes of
allowing the issuer to assert defenses that could have been asserted
by the applicant. Thus, although the issuer's claim to subrogation
may not, in and of itself, undermine the independence principle,
some fear that allowing subrogation may open the door to subse-
quent attempts to abandon that principle.
There are instances in which guarantors-who would be given
the right of subrogation-are unable to raise defenses which the
principal obligor has to the underlying obligation. The guarantor of
collection of a negotiable instrument, for example, is secondarily
liable in the sense that it may be pursued only after default by,
and action against, the maker of the instrument.91 Nonetheless, the
guarantor of collection may not be able to raise any defenses aris-
ing from the underlying contractual obligation against a holder in
due course of the instrument.9 Thus, the fact that the guarantor's
obligation is "primary," in the sense that the guarantor must pay
irrespective of any defense, does not destroy the otherwise "sec-
ondary" nature of the guarantor's obligation when subrogation is
an issue.
Furthermore, the surety or guarantor's obligation to pay is inde-
pendent of any defense to the underlying contract based on dis-
charge in insolvency,9 voidability of the underlying obligation due
to incapacity of the principal obligor,94 or release of the principal
obligor (as long as the right of recourse is preserved)." Most im-
portantly, guarantors may, and frequently do, contractually waive
any defenses the principal obligor has to the underlying contract.9
Indeed, a letter of credit may be viewed in the same manner as the
guaranty of a negotiable instrument: because of the commercial na-
ture of the instrument or credit, the guarantor or issuer has statu-
torily waived the right to raise certain defenses against the holder
or beneficiary
91. U.C.C. § 3-419(d) (1990).
92. Id., U.C.C. § 3-416(2) (1989).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 30(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
94. Id. § 30(1)(b).
95. Id. § 30(1)(c).
96. See td. § 30(1) (stating that defenses are available unless "otherwise agreed").
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d. Nonperformance of Underlying Obligation
The phrases "primary liability" and "secondary liability" have
also been used to describe whether the issuer's obligation to pay
depends upon actual nonperformance of the underlying obliga-
tion.9 7 A typical passage appears in a leading treatise on letter-of-
credit law: "The liability of the guarantor is secondary and arises
upon nonperformance by the third party, the 'principal obligor.'
The liability of the issuer under a credit is primary, not secondary,
and it arises upon the presentation of documents, not on the non-
performance of a principal obligor."98 Because the issuer must pay
upon presentation of documents, "regardless" of the underlying
obligation,99 some courts have viewed the payment on the credit as
satisfying only the obligation of the issuer and not that of the
debtor on the underlying obligation; thus, the issuer was paying a
debt for which it was primarily liable. 100
As the passage above makes clear, the "primary-secondary" dis-
tinction is being invoked here to distinguish letters of credit from
guaranties or surety relationships by focusing on what triggers the
obligor's obligation to pay The language is used to describe the
relationship of the parties in the prepayment period. In most in-
97. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser
Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (holding that the obligation of the
guarantor cannot mature unless the principal debtor actually has defaulted, but that the
actual facts were irrelevant to the obligation of the issuer).
98. JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 2.1011] (2d ed. 1991). As two other
authors observed:
Recovery under a guarantee is predicated upon the primary obligor's nonper-
formance in fact of its guaranteed obligations. The guarantor is therefore only
secondarily liable with respect to the same obligation of the primary obligor.
Recovery under a standby letter of credit, on the other hand, requires only the
presentation of the requisite documents (whether or not the applicant has in
fact performed its obligations under the underlying agreement), and the
issuer is primarily liable with respect to its obligations under the letter of
credit (which obligations, needless to say, are different from those of the appli-
cant under the underlying agreement).
Arnold & Bransilver, supra note 57, at 279-80 (citations omitted). The authors state else-
where: "The engagement is a letter of credit if the issuer has a primary obligation that is
dependent solely upon the presentation of conforming documents and not upon the factual
performance or nonperformance by the applicant of its obligations under the underlying
agreement." Id. at 281.
99. See Kaiser Steel, 89 B.R. at 152.
100. Id.
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stances, the "primary-secondary" distinction is used to determine
initially which body of law applies to a specific undertaking: the
letter-of-credit law or the law of guaranties or suretyship. 1 ' Most
often, the issue has been whether an issuer can raise defenses aris-
ing from the underlying contract. 0 2 Nonetheless, the same distinc-
tion has served to deny subrogation in a letter-of-credit context. 0 3
Yet, the focus of this analysis is prepayment, i.e., what triggers the
issuer's payment obligation. Importing this analysis into the
postpayment period without careful scrutiny is misleading.
The use of the "primary-secondary" distinction in this sense is
merely a restatement of the independence principle in determining
whether the obligation undertaken by the bank is that of an issuer
under a letter of credit or that of a guarantor. If the undertaking is
independent of the underlying transaction, the transaction is a let-
ter of credit; if it is dependent upon the underlying transaction,
the transaction thus qualifies as a guaranty
More importantly, this use of the "primary-secondary" distinc-
tion focuses on the prehonor stage-the events that give rise to the
issuer's obligation to pay-and does not deal with the posthonor
stage at all. Such use does not answer the question of whether pay-
ment by the issuer, in addition to satisfying the issuer's letter-of-
credit obligation, also satisfies the applicant's obligation on the un-
derlying transaction. Nor does it answer the question of whether,
101. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F Supp. 734, 735 (D. Minn.
1976). Commentators have observed that the "primary-secondary" test is analogous to the
test focusing on whether performance depends upon the presentation of documents or the
existence of facts such as default, effectuating the same principle. Arnold & Bransilver,
supra note 57, at 281 & n.32. Thus, an obligation is deemed to be "primary" and a letter of
credit if the obligor undertakes to pay against the presentation of documents, independent
of the underlying transaction. See DOLAN, supra note 98, 1 1.05[2] (noting that some foreign
banks issue "first-demand guarantees" which are functionally letters of credit).
102. Beach v. First Union Nat'l Bank (In re Carley Capital Group), 118 B.R. 982, 986
(Bankr. W.D. Wis.) (holding that a letter of credit was not a guaranty because the issuer's
obligation to pay upon the presentation of complying documents is primary whereas the
guarantor's obligation to pay upon the principal obligor's default is secondary), af'd, 119
B.R. 646 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
103. Berliner Handels-Und Frankfurter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re
East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 B.R. 235, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (citing JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 18-2, at 713 (2d ed. 1980)); Carley Capital, 118 B.R. at 991.
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once payment has been made to the beneficiary, the issuer or the
applicant should carry the ultimate responsibility for the payment.
e. Issuer or Account Debtor
Last, determining who is "primarily liable" may refer to ascer-
taining who, as between the issuer and the account debtor (the
person against whom subrogation is sought), is ultimately responsi-
ble for the debt. The Restatement of Suretyship uses the phrase
"principal obligor" instead of "primary obligor" to refer to the one
of the two people owing performance to the same obligee who has
the duty to the other to perform the underlying obligation. 04 The
key is the relationship between the two obligors (in a letter-of-
credit context, the issuer and the applicant), not the relationship
between one of the obligors (the issuer) and the obligee (the
beneficiary).
Under the law of subrogation, one frequently articulated require-
ment is that the payment by the subrogee (the person seeking sub-
rogation) must have been used to satisfy a debt for which the sub-
rogee was not primarily liable.105 This requirement has operated,
for example, to deny subrogation for a partner's payment of tax
debts found to be part of the partner's own obligations.'0 An obli-
gor may have an independent contractual obligation to the obligee
based on a surety bond or guaranty, and in this sense the obligor's
undertaking is "primary" If, however, as between that obligor and
a second obligor, the second obligor has assumed an obligation to
reimburse, such that the second obligor's undertaking could be
deemed "primary," courts have allowed subrogation, 10 7 even in the
letter-of-credit context. 0
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1(d)(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
105. Mary Pappas, Reconciling Standby Letters of Credit and the Principles of Subroga-
tion in Section 509, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 227, 231-32 (1990); e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150, 152 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1988); In re Glade Springs, Inc., 47 B.R. 780, 785 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985), afl'd sub nom.
Chemical Bank v. Craig (In re Glade Springs, Inc.), 826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987).
106. See Ridge v. Smothers (In re Smothers), 60 B.R. 733 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
107. O'Neal v. Stuart, 281 F 715 (6th Cir. 1922) (allowing subrogation when, as between
two makers of a note secured by the vendor's lien, one maker had agreed to be the principal
obligor).
108. Glade Springs, 47 B.R. at 785.
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When the law of subrogation is considered, the key inquiry is
whether the issuer or the applicant, i.e., the person seeking subro-
gation or the person against whom subrogation is sought, ulti-
mately should be liable for paying the debt. As one court correctly
noted in its discussion of a case that described the issuer's obliga-
tion as a "primary" obligation:
[The court] failed to distinguish between the primary liability of
a debtor to its creditor to repay a loan and the primary obliga-
tion of the issuer to its beneficiary to honor a letter of credit.
When a standby credit supporting a loan is honored, the issuer
admittedly is satisfying its obligation as a primary obligor to
honor the standby credit, but at the same time it is in fact satis-
fying a debt for which a person other than the issuer is primarily
liable. This distinction, although not recognized by [the court],
is critical. An issuer is not primarily liable on the debt sup-
ported by its standby credit."0 9
This approach, which focuses not on the nature of the obligor's
undertaking to the obligee, but on the relationship between the
two obligors, is reinforced by the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of
subrogation. Rather than using "primary-secondary" terminology,
the Bankruptcy Code specifically provides that an entity may not
be subrogated to the rights of a creditor if, "as between the debtor
and such entity, such entity received the consideration for the
claim held by such creditor." 1 0 Under this provision, an entity
that is ultimately liable on the debt cannot recover from a surety
or codebtor. 111
109. In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199, 204 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (discussing
Kaiser Steel, 89 B.R. 150) (footnote omitted); see also Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing
Valley Vue with approval).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 509(b)(2) (1988).
Ill. The legislative history makes this clear. See 124 CONG. REc. 33,997-98 (1978) (state-
ment of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6521; id. at 32,398 (statement
of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6452.
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2. Redefining "Primary-Secondary" Obligations by Reference
to the Restatement of Security and the Restatement of
Suretyship
The above discussion of the use of the "primary-secondary" di-
chotomy demonstrates that in the letter-of-credit context, claims
that the issuer's obligation is "primary" have focused on the pre-
payment period. The thrust of those uses is 1) what triggers the
payment obligation, and 2) what defenses to payment are
available.
Subrogation, however, is a doctrine that applies after payment
has been made. In this context, the terms "secondary" and "pri-
mary" take on a different meaning. In determining whether the ob-
ligation of the issuer is a "primary" obligation depriving the issuer
of the ability to invoke the doctrine of subrogation, it seems appro-
priate to examine the application of the doctrine of subroga-
tion-particularly the requirement that the "payment must satisfy
a debt for which the codebtor was not primarily liable." '112
The above-quoted statement recognizes, as it must, that one
codebtor may be subrogated to the creditor's rights against the
other codebtor,113 even though codebtors are arguably jointly and
severally liable in most situations. Under joint and several liability,
the creditor may proceed against one of the codebtors for the
whole without prior demand upon or default by the other co-
debtor. In this context, then, "primary" does not mean "payable
prior to demand upon or default by the other party"
What is meant by "primary" can be gleaned from the comments
to the Restatement of Restitution, discussing circumstances under
which a person will be denied subrogation because he acted offi-
ciously For example, the Restatement says, "He is not officious
where he was under a duty to make the payment, as for example
where he was a surety ,,14 Moreover, the Restatement's discussion
112. Kaiser Steel, 89 B.R. at 152.
113. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the right of subrogation in 11 U.S.C § 509; it al-
lows a right of subrogation to "an entity that is liable with the debtor" on the claim. 11
U.S.C. § 509(a). The Restatement of Suretyship recognizes that in a codebtor situation, one
person may be a principal obligor as to part of an obligation (and therefore have no right to
subrogation) and a secondary obligor as to the other part (with a right of subrogation).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 cmt. n (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
114. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 cmt. b (1937).
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of officiousness contains a cross-reference to its general rule on in-
demnity, which provides: "A person who, in whole or in part, has
discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between
himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is
entitled to indemnity from the other 115 Thus, the key is not
whether the person-here the issuer-is under an independent
contractual duty to pay the beneficiary Indeed, "[s]o far as the
creditor is concerned, the surety may be the principal obligor." 6
Rather, the key is whether, as between that person and another
such as the applicant, the other should be liable.
This is precisely the approach adopted by the Restatement of
Suretyship. Under the Restatement, the terms "primary" and
"secondary" do not refer to the order in which the obligors are ap-
proached for payment, whether the secondary obligor has a con-
tractual obligation to pay the obligee, or whether the secondary ob-
ligor's duty to pay is conditional upon default by the primary
obligee. Rather, the dichotomy between "primary" and "second-
ary" liability is used to determine which of two obligors bears the
ultimate responsibility for payment. The Restatement of Surety-
ship, in its requirements for establishment of suretyship status,
therefore provides: "[A]s between the principal obligor and the
secondary obligor, the principal obligor has a duty to perform the
underlying obligation or bear the cost of performance."''  Thus,
when an owner of property encumbered by a mortgage transfers
the property to a person who assumes the mortgage debt, a surety-
ship relationship arises."" Even though the first owner of the prop-
erty remains liable to the mortgagee under the original mortgage
and the mortgagee may pursue the owner without prior demand
upon the transferee, the original owner is deemed to be the second-
ary obligor in a surety relationship with the transferee/principal
obligor and the creditor because, as between the original owner
and the transferee, the transferee has the obligation to perform." 9
That the issuer also has an obligation running directly to the
beneficiary based on the letter of credit should not be determina-
115. Id. § 76.
116. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 cmt. f (1941).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § l(d) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
118. See id. § 1 illus. 20.
119. See id. § 2 cmts. e-f.
1118 [Vol. 34:1087
SURETYSHIP AND LETTERS OF CREDIT
tive. In most situations, a surety or guarantor has an obligation to
the creditor based on a contractual undertaking to which the prin-
cipal obligor is not privy No direct relationship between the prin-
cipal obligor and the obligee is necessary;120 although the under-
taking of the secondary obligor must be contractual,' 2 ' the contract
itself is most often between the secondary obligor and the credi-
tor. 22 Moreover, the obligation of the surety or guarantor to the
creditor may be different from the obligation of the principal obli-
gor to the creditor. 2
3
In the letter-of-credit context, the general rule is that in the
postpayment period, the applicant (and not the issuer) has the ul-
timate responsibility (or is "primarily liable") and hence must re-
imburse the issuer for the amount of the draw.124 This is true
whether or not the issuer had contractually obtained a reimburse-
ment right from the applicant. This statutory recognition of a right
to reimbursement is strong evidence that, as between an issuer and
an applicant, the applicant bears the ultimate responsibility for
paying whatever was owed to the beneficiary Thus, "as between
the principal obligor [applicant] and the secondary obligor [issuer],
the principal obligor has a duty to perform the underlying obliga-
tion or bear the cost of performance.' 1 25 The requirement of the
Restatement is met.
120. See id. § 1 cmt. m.
121. Id. § l(1)(b).
122. See id. § 2(a).
123. For the Restatement of Suretyship to apply, the secondary obligee must "owe[ ]
performance, in whole or in part, of the duty of the principal obligor to the obli-
gee," id. § 1(1)(b)(1), or the obligee must have "recourse against the secondary obligor or its
property" in the event of the principal's default or to protect the obligee against the obli-
gor's nonperformance. Id. § 1(1)(b)(2). The secondary obligation need not be identical, but
may be of a different character or for a smaller amount "so long as the essential purpose of
the secondary obligation is to protect the obligee against the actual or potential non-per-
formance of the underlying obligation by giving the obligee recourse against the secondary
obligation." Id. § 1 cmt. j. It should be noted that a letter of credit, whether commercial or
standby, could pass that test. The essential purpose of a standby letter of credit is to pro-
tect the beneficiary in the event of default by the customer, whereas the purpose of the
commercial letter of credit is to shift the risk of the buyer's creditworthiness from the seller/
beneficiary to the issuer-in other words, to protect the beneficiary/obligee against potential
nonperformance by the primary obligor.
124. This rule assumes, of course, that a complying presentation was made. U.C.C. § 5-
114 (1990).
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1(d) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
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E. Issuer's Obligation Under a Credit Is Independent of the
Underlying Obligation of the Applicant
As demonstrated above, the key question in resolving the appli-
cability of the doctrine of subrogation to letters of credit is not
whether the obligation of the issuer is "primary" or "secondary,"
or whether a letter of credit is or is not similar to a guaranty
Rather, the issue is whether application of the doctrine of subroga-
tion violates the independence principle. 126 Several courts have de-
nied subrogation rights in the letter-of-credit context, asserting
that "an issuer of a letter of credit may not look to the underlying
contract between its customer and the beneficiary of the letter of
credit in connection with its duty to honor the letter of credit. '127
One court, in denying subrogation because it offended the inde-
pendence principle, observed:
[T]he doctrines of guarantee and subrogation are not applicable
to letter of credit transactions In addition, extension of
those doctrines to a transaction involving a letter of credit would
seriously undermine the usefulness of the instrument without
substantially advancing the equities of the transaction. The
unique contribution of letters of credit to commercial transac-
tions is the certainty and swiftness of payment and the limita-
tion of administrative and legal expenses. These goals would not
be obtained if parties to the transaction were permitted to in-
voke the law of guarantee and subrogation.
128
126. Professor Kozolchyk, in examining the protection that should be afforded sharehold-
ers and depositors of banks issuing standby letters of credit, made the same observation:
The risks involved in standby issuance are not inherent in the use of the guar-
antee label or in the assumption of a "secondary" as opposed to a "primary"
liability. Rather, risks arise in the bank's involvement with underlying transac-
tions instead of with the payment of monetary promises susceptible to docu-
mentary verification by banking employees.
Kozolchyk, supra note 65, at 344.
127. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Economic Enters., Inc. (In re Economic Enters.,
Inc.) 44 B.R. 230, 231 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); accord Beach v. First Union Nat'l Bank (In
re Carley Capital Group), 119 B.R. 646, 651 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Berliner Handels-Und Frank-
furter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117
B.R. 235, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990). But see Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the vitality of the inde-
pendence principle is "unlikely to be substantially diminished" if subrogation is allowed).
128. Carley Capital, 119 B.R. at 651.
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The court was undoubtedly correct in its conclusion that appli-
cation of some of the doctrines of guaranty-for example, allowing
the issuer to raise defenses available on the underlying obligation
as a defense to payment on the letter of credit or allowing the is-
suer to assert the right of exoneration-would undermine the use-
fulness of letters of credit. If an issuer were permitted to raise de-
fenses beyond the noncompliance of the documents presented, the
use of letters of credit as a means of "rapid payment, up front
129
would be defeated, eliminating the certainty and swiftness of pay-
ment that is their hallmark. Moreover, if an issuer were not only
permitted to use such defenses but also required to determine
compliance with the underlying agreement, administrative costs,
and presumably legal costs as well when such cases proceeded to
litigation, would increase. As a result, most of the scholarship and
case law to date on the independence principle has been concerned
with attempts to defer or defeat payment obligations on letters of
credit by asserting defenses that could be asserted to the underly-
ing obligation, such as fraud in or breach of the underlying agree-
ment.130 Indeed, it is the fear that defenses on the underlying obli-
gation will "percolate up" into the letter-of-credit transaction that
undoubtedly accounts for much of the rhetoric attempting to dis-
tinguish letters of credit from guaranty obligations.1 31
It is difficult to see, however, how allowing subrogation once
payment has been made by the issuer or party seeking subroga-
tion will interfere with the operation of letters of credit as swift
and certain payment mechanisms. Suretyship defenses or defenses
available to guarantors are asserted in the prepayment period. As
129. Jarvis, supra note 48, at 359.
130. See, e.g., John F Dolan, Standby Letters of Credit and Fraud (Is the Standby Only
Another Invention of Goldsmiths in Lombard Street?), 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1985); Peter
Ellinger, Fraud in Documentary Credit Transactions, 1981 J. Bus. L. 258; Henry Harfield,
Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596 (1978); Kozolchyk, supra
note 65; Stephen J. Leacock, Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment
of Letters of Credit in International Transactions, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885 (1984).
131. This fear explains the negative references to guaranty law in Article 5 itself. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 5-101 official cmt. (1990) ("The other source of law respecting letters of credit is
the law of contracts with occasional unfortunate excursions into the law of guaranty."); id.
§ 5-103 official cmt. 3 ("The legal relations between the customer and the beneficiary turn
on the underlying transaction between them The issuer is not a guarantor of the
performance of these underlying transactions.").
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such, they will defeat prompt and certain payment. Subrogation
and reimbursement claims are asserted in the postpayment period;
as such, they should not defeat prompt and certain payment.'32 In-
deed, Article 5 implies a right of reimbursement in favor of the
issuer upon honor of the letter of credit, whether or not the issuer
bargained for the right.13 True, the right to reimbursement merely
requires the issuer to demonstrate that it complied with its obliga-
tions under the credit, 4 whereas subrogation requires the issuer to
prove what rights existed on the underlying obligation. 3 5 An issuer
may determine that it does not want to invoke any of the rights
arising from the underlying obligation because of the difficulty and
costs involved in bringing and prevailing upon such a claim.
Whether to pursue those rights, however, should best be left to the
issuer, absent a compelling reason for denying the issuer that right.
Some may fear that once subrogation is recognized, an issuer will
attempt to assert rights obtained through subrogation to defend an
action based on the letter of credit. This situation would occur, for
example, if the issuer attempted to assert its applicant's rights
against the beneficiary by dishonoring the credit.l' 6 Attempts to
invoke defenses or claims based on the underlying obligation to
justify nonpayment of the letter of credit, or to enjoin payment of
the credit, have traditionally been condemned under letter-of-
132. The suretyship right of exoneration, however, is a right which operates in the pre-
payment period. The secondary obligor has the right to force the primary obligor to perform
before performance is required by the secondary obligor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETY-
SHIP § 17(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992). Application of this right in the letter-of-credit con-
text would defeat the independence principle. First, performance of the underlying obliga-
tion by the primary obligor will not necessarily release the issuer from its obligations on the
letter of credit, which operates independently of the performance or nonperformance of the
underlying obligation. Second, the net effect of the exercise of the right of exoneration is to
delay performance by the secondary obligor pending performance by the principal obligor;
such an effect would destroy the certainty of swift payment that is at the heart of letter-of-
credit transactions.
133. U.C.C. § 5-114.
134. Id.
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 23 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
136. The issuer would claim that if it paid the letter of credit, it would be subrogated to
the customer's rights against the beneficiary. Because it would have those rights after pay-
ment, it should be able to assert them prior to payment as a defense or counterclaim to the
beneficiary's action based on the credit.
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credit law. 137 There is little reason to believe that this basic rule
would change if subrogation were allowed. Under the Restatement
of Suretyship, the right to subrogation arises only upon pay-
ment;13 s thus, no subrogation claim can be raised as a defense to
the payment by the issuer. When an issuer claims to be subrogated
to an applicant's rights against the beneficiary, not by operation of
law but by virtue of an assignment of those rights to the issuer, the
same possibility exists that the issuer may assert these rights in an
attempt to avoid payment on the letter of credit; yet, the law is
clear that an issuer must honor the draft regardless of whether the
goods conform to the underlying contract. 3 9 An issuer may not re-
fuse payment upon tender of conforming documents absent agree-
ment to the contrary 140 The same result should follow if the issuer
claims to be subrogated as a matter of equity This result could, of
course, be made even clearer and more explicit if such matters
were dealt with in a restatement or statutory provision.
Alternatively, the issuer might attempt to argue that the benefi-
ciary's release of collateral to which the issuer would be subrogated
discharges the issuer from its obligations on the credit.'4 ' These
results unquestionably would violate the independence principle,
because again the claim would delay prompt payment on the
credit. Such an outcome, however, does not necessarily or inevita-
bly flow once subrogation is allowed. The Restatement of Surety-
ship recognizes waiver of suretyship defenses; 142 such consent may
137. See U.C.C. § 5-114(i). For a more general discussion, see the authorities cited supra
note 130.
138. In fact, a general principle of the equitable right of subrogation is that it does not
arise until the entire debt is satisfied. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHiP § 23 (Tent.
Draft No. 2) (providing that subrogation arises "[u]pon total satisfaction of the underlying
obligation" and only "to the extent that performance of the secondary obligation contrib-
uted to the satisfaction"); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United Penn Bank,
524 A.2d 958, 963 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (finding no right to subrogation until the surety has
paid), allocatur denied, 536 A.2d 1333 (Pa. 1987). If the issuer has dishonored the letter of
credit, its performance has in no way contributed to the satisfaction of-the debt; if it has not
honored the letter, its performance has not contributed to the satisfaction of the debt, nor
has the debt been fully satisfied.
139. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1).
140. Id. §§ 5-106(2), -114(1).
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 38 (Tent. Draft No. 2) (stating that im-
pairment of collateral may discharge the secondary obligation).
142. Id. § 42.
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be express or implied. 43 The Restatement already lists some cir-
cumstances under which the law presumes a waiver; use of a letter
of credit easily could be added.
Nonetheless, some courts assert that allowing subrogation
"would violate the spirit and intent of the law developing under
Article 5 which prohibits an issuer from interfering with the
underlying contract.'1 44 One court, applying the independence
principle, noted: "If a bank issues a letter of credit without first
securing funds from its customer, the beneficiary should not
be prejudiced by the bank's deliberate inaction or inadvertence. ' '1 45
Yet, if the beneficiary is paid in full as a result of the letter of
credit's being honored, and the issuer seeks subrogation to the
rights of the beneficiary against the applicant, it is difficult to see
how the beneficiary is prejudiced or the independence principle vi-
olated. The beneficiary has received payment in full and would not
be able to pursue these rights on its own. If the beneficiary has
been paid in full, and the issuer seeks subrogation to the rights of
the applicant against the beneficiary (e.g., for breach of the under-
lying obligation), the prejudice to the beneficiary is that the issuer,
rather than the applicant, is bringing suit. Indeed, in the latter sit-
uation, to deny subrogation would lead to unjust enrichment of the
beneficiary, who has been paid in full pursuant to the letter of
credit despite the beneficiary's failure to perform the underlying
contract.
As one court put it:
According to the independence principle each party is indepen-
dently liable. Absent some agreement to the contrary, a party in
a letter of credit transaction is not liable with any other party
on a claim. When [the issuer] paid [the beneficiary], [the
issuer] paid its own debt, not a debt of the Debtor. Subrogation
is not available to one who simply pays his own debt."6
143. Id. § 42 cmt. d.
144. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Economic Enters., Inc. (In re Economic Enters.,
Inc.) 44 B.R. 230, 232 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
145. Id. (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F Supp. 776, 788 (D. Conn.
1980)).
146. Berliner Handels-Und Frankfurter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re
East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 B.R. 235, 240 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (citations
omitted).
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What this court failed to recognize is that, as discussed above, a
party may pay its own debt, and at the same time satisfy the debt
of another. An insurance company which pays out on its fire insur-
ance policy to its insured will be paying its own debt under the
policy, but at the same time will be satisfying the debt that a
third-party tortfeasor owes to the insured. A bonding company
which pays out on a construction bond is paying out on a contrac-
tual obligation (the bond) on which no other party is liable; but in
so doing, it is satisfying the debt of the insured to the beneficiary
of the bond.
Thus, the independence principle does not mean that the obliga-
tions are completely and for all purposes independent. It means
that the underlying contractual obligation has no effect upon the
issuer's obligation on the letter of credit and that the issuer's obli-
gation to pay on the credit is "independent" of the underlying
transaction. Nor does it mean that the only rights and obligations
are those existing between the issuer and the beneficiary, without
any regard to any responsibility on the part of the applicant or any
ability to claim rights based on the underlying transaction. Article
5 recognizes both the responsibilities of the applicant to the is-
suer 147 and the possibility that the issuer may claim rights on the
underlying obligation.148
Overseas Trading Corp. v. Irving Trust Corp.14 9 was one of the
first cases to hold that because the contract between a buyer and
seller was completely independent of the letter-of-credit agreement
between the buyer and the issuer, the doctrine of subrogation was
inapplicable. Overseas Trading was not a case in which the issuer
sought subrogation to the rights of the beneficiary against the ap-
plicant. Instead, the applicant sued the issuer, who had honored a
draw on the letter of credit and recouped its advances from the
applicant's funds, for wrongfully honoring the letter of credit.150 As
one of its affirmative defenses, the issuer alleged that the appli-
cant/buyer's failure to give notice to the beneficiary/seller of dam-
age to the goods relieved the seller of its liability for breach of war-
147. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1990).
148. Id. § 5-109 official cmt. 1.
149. 82 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
150. Id. at 73.
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ranty and impaired the issuer's right of subrogation to the breach-
of-warranty claim. 151 The issuer did not raise this impairment of
the right of subrogation as a defense to a claim of wrongful dis-
honor, 52 but as a defense to the claim of wrongful honor. Either
way, the applicant/buyer's actions with regard to the underlying
commercial contract were used as a defense to an action based on
the letter-of-credit transaction. Thus, it was not the notion of sub-
rogation per se that was objectionable and violated the indepen-
dence principle.153 Instead, it was the use of an impairment-of-
subrogafion-rights theory to attempt to defeat an action based on
the letter of credit. In essence, the issuer was saying, "I am re-
leased from my obligation to honor because the applicant impaired
my right of subrogation."
As the court observed, even if the doctrine of subrogation were
applied, the applicant/buyer's failure to assert its rights under the
sales contract should have no bearing on an action based on the
letter.'54 This observation is consistent with the Restatement of
Suretyship, which provides that the obligee's impairment of collat-
eral may discharge the secondary obligor,5' but makes no similar
provision in the event of acts by the principal obligor.
151. Id. at 76.
152. Were the claim of wrongful impairment of the right to subrogation raised in this
context, the surety might argue that to the extent the impairment of the secondary obligor's
right of subrogation resulted in a loss to the secondary obligor, the secondary obligor could
raise this "suretyship defense" to the obligee's action. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETY-
SHIP § 33(2)(e) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993). The defense would likewise fail, however, because
the "impairing act" must have been an act by "the obligee, acting alone or in conjunction
with the principal obligor or any other person." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33
(Prelim. Draft No. 2, 1992). Although Preliminary Draft No. 2 has since been superceded, I
use its language here because it is more concise than the phrasing of subsequent drafts. In
Overseas Trading, the "impairing act" was that of the primary obligor, not the obligee;
moreover it was raised not as a defense to a failure-to-honor claim, but as a defense to a
claim of wrongful honor. See Overseas Trading, 82 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75.
153. Overseas Trading, 82 N.Y.S.2d at 76. The court apparently recognized the weakness
of its position on the subrogation issue. Although it commented that "no principle of subro-
gation applies here," id., the court went on to say that "[e]ven if it did, this is not analogous
to the situation which prevails in suretyship." Id.
154. Id. The court made an analogy to the insurer of goods stored in a warehouse, noting
that failure by the owner of the goods to assert its rights against the warehouseman based
on the contract of bailment is no defense to an action on the insurance policy. Id.
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 38 (Tent. Draft No. 2).
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The case is nonetheless instructive about one of the fears that
underlie the debate about subrogation in the letter-of-credit con-
text: the fear that allowing subrogation will remove the wall be-
tween letters of credit and other suretyship devices, ultimately al-
lowing other suretyship doctrines, such as the suretyship defenses,
to be asserted as defenses to nonpayment in actions involving let-
ters of credit. Whether that fear is justified is a matter of debate.
Maintaining an artificial wall between letters of credit and other
suretyship devices obviously discourages any such incursions. Yet
Article 5 could recognize the subrogation doctrine and still make
clear that the suretyship defenses will not be recognized, or that
claims based on the right of subrogation cannot be raised in an
action based on a letter of credit. Alternatively, the Restatement of
Suretyship could provide that letters of credit are a type of surety-
ship device in which the rights against the principal obligor arising
upon performance by the issuer accrue,15 6 but the suretyship de-
fenses do not.157
156. Under the Restatement, a secondary obligor has four main rights against the pri-
mary obligor: 1) the right of exoneration (the right to force the primary obligor to perform
its duties), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 14(2)(a), 17 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992);
2) the right of reimbursement, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 18-21 (Tent. Draft
No. 2); 3) the right of restitution, id. § 22; and 4) the right of subrogation, id. §§ 23-27. An
issuer of a letter of credit already has a statutory right of reimbursement, U.C.C. § 5-114
(1990), and typically has a contractual right of reimbursement as well. Recognition of any-
thing akin to a right of exoneration would clearly undermine a critical function of letters of
credit: providing the beneficiary with a swift payment mechanism that does not require
prior resort to the underlying commercial transaction. See supra text accompanying notes
128-31. The right of restitution is important only in those situations in which a secondary
obligor does not have a right of reimbursement, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 22 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 2); this claim to restitution may become important in a letter-
of-credit context in which the issuer honors the letter of credit but loses its reimbursement
right because it pays over on technically nonconforming documents. The more important
remaining right in the letter-of-credit context, however, is the right of subrogation.
157. Other minor adjustments to general articulations of the subrogation doctrine argua-
bly would be necessary if subrogation were applied in the letter-of-credit context. For exam-
ple, under the Restatement of Suretyship, if the secondary obligor pays even though the
primary obligor is not in default, it will be denied subrogation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP § 23 cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 2). This rule, however, applies only if the liability
of the secondary obligor was conditioned upon the actual default of the principal. Thus, in a
letter-of-credit situation in which the obligation of the issuer (as secondary obligor) is to pay
whether or not there is a default on the underlying obligation, the absence of default would
not bar subrogation.
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V SUBROGATION OF WHOM TO WHOSE RIGHTS AGAINST WHOM
The prior discussion focuses on the availability of subrogation in
a letter-of-credit context and, principally, the claim of an issuer
that it should be subrogated to the rights of the beneficiary against
the applicant. Subrogation in a letter-of-credit context is much
more complex, however. Many of the letter-of-credit subrogation
cases are complicated by the courts' failure to distinguish which
party is being subrogated to whose rights against whom, and their
failure to identify the claimed implications of the right to subroga-
tion. Ultimately, the determinations of whether the pre-
requisites of subrogation are met, whether the claimed subrogation
violates any critical principles such as the independence doctrine,
and whether equities favor subrogation may turn on such dis-
tinctions.
A. Subrogatin of Issuer to Rights of Beneficiary
In a simple letter-of-credit transaction involving merely an ap-
plicant, an issuer, and a beneficiary, the subrogation issue arises
when the issuer honors the draw and then claims to be subrogated
to the beneficiary's rights against the applicant. When an issuer
has honored a letter of credit, it has a statutory right of reimburse-
ment against the applicant" 8 and often a contractual right of reim-
bursement as well. Nonetheless, at times the issuer may prefer to
assert the beneficiary's claim against the applicant rather than its
own; for example, the beneficiary's claim may be secured," 9 the
beneficiary's claim may be entitled to priority,6 0 or the beneficiary
may have additional rights such as the seller's reclamation right
against an insolvent buyer 16 or a right to set off. 62
158. U.C.C. § 5-114(3).
159. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel
Corp.), 89 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (representing the classic case of an issuer seeking
subrogation to the rights of the paid beneficiary which had a lien on the customers' assets).
160. In re National Serv. Lines, Inc., 80 B.R. 144 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987).
161. Berliner Handels-Und Frankfurter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc. (In re
East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 B.R. 235 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (illustrating a case in
which the issuer of a commercial letter of credit for purchase of steel claimed subrogation to
the beneficiary/seller's right of reclamation under 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1988) and U.C.C. § 2-
702(2) (1977)).
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The current version of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial
Code does not address the ability to subrogate the issuer to the
rights of the beneficiary 163 Yet, in many. respects, this claim of
subrogation appears on its face to satisfy the classic articulation of
subrogation found in the Restatement of Restitution:
Where property of one person is used in discharging an obliga-
tion owed by another or a lien upon the property of another,
under such circumstances that the other would be unjustly en-
riched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former
is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee or lien-
holder.164
This general articulation of the doctrine has been refined in
more specific situations. Thus, in the proposed Restatement of
Suretyship, when by definition a surety or secondary obligor in
satisfying the claim of the obligee discharges the debt owed by the
principal obligor, the right of subrogation is given to the surety or
secondary obligor.165 Many courts have espoused a five-part test
which must be satisfied before the doctrine of subrogation may be
invoked.6 6 Some of these courts have focused on the general artic-
ulation of equitable subrogation and found the requirements met
in a letter-of-credit situation, while others have focused on the
more specialized requirement in the five-prong test that the claim-
ant "was not primarily liable on the debt" to deny subrogation. 6 7
162. Sun Co. v. Slamans (In re Slamans), 148 B.R. 623 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (allowing
an issuer to be subrogated to a beneficiary's right to offset amounts owed on credit card
purchases).
163. Article 5 does mention in a comment the possibility of subrogation of the issuer to
the customer's rights against the beneficiary. See znfra note 170 and accompanying text.
That comment could be construed to imply that subrogation to the beneficiary's rights is
not permissible.
164. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937).
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 23 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
166. The elements of the test are: 1) the claimant paid the creditor to protect its own
interests; 2) the claimant did not act as a volunteer; 3) the claimant was not primarily liable
for the debt; 4) the entire debt has been satisfied; and 5) allowing subrogation would not
cause injustice to the rights of others. See, e.g., Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 361 (3d Cir. 1992); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
United Penn Bank, 574 A.2d 958, 963-64 (Pa. Super. Ct.), allocatur dented, 536 A.2d 1333
(Pa. 1987).
167. E.g., Tudor Development, 968 F.2d at 361.
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It bears noting that the Uniform Commercial Code expressly
recognizes subrogation in an analogous situation; an unreimbursed
bank that has paid out over a stop order is subrogated to the rights
of the payee against the customer in the underlying transaction. 168
The right of subrogation is granted to prevent unjust enrichment
whether the customer's stop order and refusal to pay is wrongful or
not.16
9
B. Issuer Subrogation to Rights of Applicant
Against Beneficiary
The only mention of subrogation in present Article 5 occurs in
the Official Comments to section 5-109, which deal with an issuer's
obligation to its applicant. Noting that the issuer assumes no lia-
bility or responsibility for the underlying contract between the ap-
plicant and the beneficiary, the first comment observes: "The cus-
tomer will normally have direct recourse against the beneficiary if
performance fails, whereas the issuer will have such recourse only
by assignment of or in a proper case subrogation to the rights of
the customer."'' 0 Unfortunately, the comment does not elaborate
on what circumstances might constitute a "proper case." Assume,
for example, that an issuer of a commercial letter of credit covering
a shipment of goods honors a draft but fails to obtain reimburse-
ment from its applicant because of the applicant's intervening in-
solvency The goods covered by the letter of credit turn out to be
worthless. To allow the beneficiary to retain the proceeds of the
letter of credit while shipping worthless goods would clearly result
in the beneficiary's unjust enrichment. Thus, allowing such an is-
suer to be subrogated to the applicant's rights on the underlying
contract may be one of those "proper cases" referred to in Article
5. This type of subrogation should be distinguished from attempts
of the issuer to claim subrogation rights to moneys payable to the
168. U.C.C. § 4-407 (1990).
169. Similarly, U.C.C. § 2-506 grants a trade financer subrogation rights to the seller's
right to payment by the buyer.
170. U.C.C. § 5-109 official cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
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applicant by a third party as a result of events unrelated to the
letter-of-credit transaction. 17 1
C. Confirming Bank's Subrogation to Rights of Issuer
Many letter-of-credit transactions involve more than three par-
ties. A frequent additional party is the confirming bank, which en-
gages to honor a letter of credit already issued by an issuer. 1"2
Under Article 5, a confirming bank becomes liable on the letter of
credit and acquires the rights of an issuer.17 3 When the confirmer
rightfully honors the letter of credit but is not reimbursed by the
issuer, the question arises whether it may claim subrogation to the
rights of the issuer against the applicant, including any collateral
given to the issuer to secure its right to reimbursement.
Unlike cases in which the claim is to subrogation based on the
underlying contractual obligations, in this instance the confirmer's
claim to subrogation is to rights granted in the letter-of-credit
transaction itself. Thus, on the surface, such a transaction does not
implicate the independence principle. The question is not whether
a party to the letter-of-credit transaction can assert rights arising
out of the underlying commercial transaction, but whether one
party to the letter-of-credit transaction can assert the rights of an-
other party arising out of the letter-of-credit transaction itself.
Nonetheless, numerous reasons have been advanced for denying a
right of subrogation in this context. In a recent study of Article 5,
a task force of the American Bar Association, although not taking
any position on the ultimate issue, advanced five such reasons: 1) it
gives the confirmer the benefits but not the burdens of a relation-
ship with the applicant; 2) it offends the notion of finality; 3) the
confirmer does not rely on the applicant's credit and should not be
able to resort to the applicant if the issuer becomes insolvent; 4) it
rewards an imprudent confirmer that failed to bargain for contrac-
171. See Tudor Development, 968 F.2d 357, discussed supra note 60. Although the major-
ity was undoubtedly correct that the issuer should be denied subrogation rights, it incor-
rectly did so on the ground that subrogation is unavailable to issuers of letters of credit,
rather than on the ground that no subrogation rights exist to the applicant's rights against
third parties.
172. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f).
173. Id. § 5-107(2).
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tual rights against the applicant; and 5) permitting recovery to an
imprudent payor brings about a result based on fortuity 174
Each of these reasons may be countered. First, the confirmer
does have certain burdens, such as the obligation to honor the
credit to the extent of its confirmation and the obligation to honor
only presentations complying with the credit. Failure to satisfy
those obligations will make the confirmer liable to the issuer and,
presumably, to the applicant as well. Second, although one of the
purposes of a letter of credit is to guarantee speedy payment of an
obligation, the presence of a letter of credit is not a guaranty that a
party unjustly enriched by the honor will not subsequently be held
responsible. Third, in subrogation, the key issue is whether the
person seeking subrogation satisfied the debt of the person to
whose position it seeks subrogation, not whether the person seek-
ing subrogation relied on the credit of the person to whom the debt
or obligation was owed. Here, the person seeking subrogation (the
confirmer) satisfied the debt of the issuer by paying the letter of
credit and should now be permitted to exercise the rights of the
issuer, whether or not it relied on the creditworthiness of the ap-
plicant. Fourth, the failure to bargain for contractual rights against
the applicant should not be fatal; in most instances in which sub-
rogation is granted (e.g., in the classic case of guarantors and sure-
ties), it is equally possible to bargain for such rights, yet the failure
to do so is not fatal to the subrogation claim. Last, denying subro-
gation would unjustly enrich the applicant; its debt to the benefi-
ciary would be satisfied, yet its obligation to the issuer would be
extinguished, all by the mere fortuity of the issuer's intervening
insolvency 175
174. Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5
(Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAW. 1521, 1582 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force Study]. Addi-
tional arguments against subrogation were raised (and dismissed) in In re Glade Springs,
Inc., 47 B.R. 780 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that the independence principle was
violated; subrogation should not be allowed to displace the real agreement between parties;
and a confirmer's obligation is an independent and contractual obligation, not a guaranty or
surety obligation), aff'd sub nom. Chemical Bank v. Craig (In re Glade Springs, Inc.), 826
F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987).
175. See also Task Force Study, supra note 174, at 1582-83 (advancing other reasons in
favor of subrogation).
[Vol. 34:10871132
SURETYSHIP AND LETTERS OF CREDIT
In one case dealing with the confirmer's subrogation to the is-
suer's rights, 6 the argument was raised that the confirmer's duty
to honor the letter of credit was an independent and primary obli-
gation and that no guaranty or suretyship relationship existed.
17 7
The Sixth Circuit dismissed that argument, stating: "We need not
address the question of whether the relationship between [con-
firmer] and [issuer] is a guaranty or surety arrangement since the
Restatement [of Restitution] permits subrogation regardless of the
precise nature of the obligation of the issuing bank to the confirm-
ing bank. ' 17 8
D. Subrogation of Applicant to Rights of Beneficiary Against
Account Applicant
In the paradigm letter-of-credit transaction, there are three par-
ties: the customer/applicant, the issuer, and the beneficiary Yet in
some instances, the person who applies for the letter of credit and
obligates himself to reimburse the issuer (the applicant) is not the
person for whose benefit the letter of credit is issued (the account
debtor), who owes the underlying contractual obligation to the
beneficiary 179 An agent may procure a letter of credit for one of its
customers, for example, or a party lacking sufficient credentials to
obtain a needed letter of credit may request another party to ob-
tain the credit on its behalf.
In several such instances, applicants who have been called upon
to reimburse the issuer honoring the letter of credit have in turn
sought subrogation to the rights of the beneficiary against the ac-
count debtor. In effect, this scenario involves two levels of subroga-
tion: subrogation of the applicant to the rights of the issuer and
subrogation on behalf of the issuer to the rights of the beneficiary
who had received security for its claim.
176. Glade Springs, 826 F.2d 440.
177. Id. at 441-42.
178. Id. at 442 n.4.
179. See, e.g., In re Agrownautics, 125 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re Valley Vue
Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991); In re Munzenrieder Corp., 58 B.R. 228
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); In re Minnesota Kicks, Inc., 48 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
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VI. THE ARTICLE 5 DRAFTING EFFORT
The drafting of the Restatement of Suretyship has not been
proceeding in isolation. In 1991, the sponsors of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Law Institute, established a
drafting committee to undertake revisions to Article 5 of the Code
which covers letters of credit. In the context of that effort, the ap-
plicability of subrogation and other suretyship concepts to letters
of credit has received additional attention.
The latest draft of the Article 5 revision cautions, as do the ear-
lier drafts, that it is "important to recognize the distinction be-
tween letters of credit and guarantees."' 0 The importance of the
distinction, according to the comments, is that guarantors can raise
as a defense to liability that the underlying debtor has been dis-
charged or has no liability for other reasons, while the issuer's obli-
gation is independent of the underlying obligation. 8 ' Thus, the
draft cautions against confusing guaranties or suretyship agree-
ments with letters of credit and protects the swift payment mecha-
nism that is the hallmark of the letter of credit. 82 What is note-
worthy about these comments, however, is that they do not
address principles applicable in the postpayment period.
In the draft, the question of the right to subrogation in the let-
ter-of-credit context was left uncovered, just as it had been left
uncovered in the original version of Article 5. In the present in-
stance, the failure to address subrogation cannot be attributed to
the issue's lack of visibility, an explanation that might have been
plausible fifty years ago. A suggested comment, however, noting
180. U.C.C. Revised Article 5 Letters of Credit § 5-102 cmt. 1 (Draft, Jan. 29, 1993).
181. Id. For the first time, the January draft gives explicit recognition to the independ-
ence principle as "a central part of letter of credit law." Id. § 5-102(d). What is noteworthy
is the draft's articulation of the independence principle:
An issuer is not responsible for performance of the underlying contract or
other related contract between an applicant and beneficiary. The duties of an
issuer of a letter of credit are independent of the performance of those con-
tracts. Unlike a guarantor, the issuer may not assert the defenses of its appli-
cant against a beneficiary
Id.
182. Id.
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that the issue of subrogation of a confirmer or any other person
was left to other law, observes:
The independence principle is not inconsistent with the
subrogation recovery of either a confirmer (in the case of failure
of the issuer when the confirmer seeks to be subrogated to the
issuer's rights against the applicant) or of the issuer or applicant
(when the issuer pays a beneficiary and the applicant or issuer
seeks to be subrogated to the beneficiary's security interest).183
This, then, is the first "official" statement that subrogation might
be appropriate in the letter-of-credit context, and it raises the
question of why the matter needs to be left to other law If, indeed,
there is no inconsistency between subrogation and the independ-
ence principle, is it not time to recognize that in the black letter of
Article 5 or the Restatement9 Does this comment continue to leave
to other law the question of whether the engagement of the issuer
or confirmer is "primary"
' '
Ultimately, if Article 5 were to contain in its provisions (as op-
posed to its comments) an explicit acknowledgment of the right to
subrogation, as it now contains an explicit acknowledgment of the
right to reimbursement, the decision of the drafters of the Restate-
ment to exclude letters of credit will be vindicated in practice, if
not in theory Indeed, the preferable course arguably is to cover
subrogation and letters of credit in Article 5: it is a statute rather
than a restatement and consequently is better able to change the
results in states where the right to subrogation has been denied;
Article 5 deals specifically with letters of credit and is the logical
place to look for the rights of an issuer upon honor of the letter of
credit; and Article 5 could develop specific provisions on the man-
ner in which subrogation would be recognized in a letter-of-credit
context. Letters of credit would remain governed by a statutory
schema with minimal excursions into the "unfortunate world of
guarantees.' 1 84
183. Id. § 5-107 cmt. 3. The comment also endorses the position of Judge Becker in
Tudor Development Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 968 F.2d 357, 368
(3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting). Although the quoted comment addresses the rights of
issuers, confirmers, and applicants, it appears in the section on confirmation.
184. U.C.C. § 5-101 official cmt. (1990).
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The reality is that these letters of credit are being used inter-
changeably with guaranties and surety bonds. Indeed, given the
ability of parties to adjust or modify the incidents of suretyship by
contract, particularly the ability of a secondary obligor or guaran-
tor to waive any defenses of the principal obligor to the underlying
obligation8 5 as well as any suretyship defenses it may have,1 6 one
possible way to view letters of credit is as a mere commercial form
of guaranty, now subject to separate statutory treatment, for
which, as a matter of trade usage (and later statutory formulation),
a waiver-of-defenses clause is implied in every letter-of-credit
transaction.'
If issues such as subrogation were covered by Article 5, should
letters of credit continue to be excluded from the Restatement of
Suretyship9 The mere fact that an issue is covered in a statutory
provision does not preclude its coverage in a restatement as well.
Contracts for the sale of goods are not excluded from the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts merely because they are governed by
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Nor are suretyship de-
vices such as accommodation notes excluded from the Restatement
of Suretyship because they are governed by Article 3 of the Code.
The failure of the Restatement of Suretyship to acknowledge the
potential application of some of its provisions to letters of credit
thus may be questionable in theory, rendering the Restatement
less inclusive and comprehensive than might be desirable. The cur-
rent status of the drafts of the Restatement and Article 5 are even
less defensible: both avoid taking a definite stance and effectively
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 30 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993) ("[T]he
secondary obligor is free to contract to be liable on the secondary obligation even when the
principal obligor has a defense to the underlying obligation.").
186. Id. § 42. The term "suretyship defenses" refers to acts by the creditor or obligee
(such as the discharge of the primary obligor, release of collateral, or modification of the
debt) that change the secondary obligor's risks and potentially give rise to a claim of dis-
charge. See id. Title B. Suretyship Defenses, introductory note; id. §§ 33-43.
187. Thus, one can view the independence principle as a statutory waiver-of-defenses
clause. For many years, finance lessors included clauses in their leases under which the les-
sees waived any defenses or claims they might have had as a result of defects in delivery or
in the goods leased. The new Article 2A, which for the first time formally recognizes finance
leases, implies such a "hell or high water" waiver-of-defenses clause in every nonconsumer
finance lease. U.C.C. § 2A-408 (1990). Similarly, the notion of strict compliance is a set of
terms (agreed upon by the issuer and beneficiary, or implied by law) under which the guar-
anty is made.
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relegate the matter to "other law." With only comments to guide
them, courts confronted with subrogation issues in the letter-of-
credit context will continue to struggle without the enlightened
guidance of those knowledgeable in the field.
